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GRASSROOTS TRANSNATIONALISM: REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
ORGANIZING DURING THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION 
Sarah Khalbuss, Bachelor of Philosophy 
University of Pittsburgh, 2015
 
 
Across the world, human rights organizations have become increasingly transnational, 
and their scope can often be regional. This thesis explores Arab human rights groups working in 
local contexts during the Egyptian Revolution. I discuss the background of the revolution and 
challenges to human rights organizing in Egypt. In the first empirical part, I conduct a content 
analysis of newspapers regarding two regional groups headquartered in Cairo, the Arab 
Network for Human Rights Information and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. In 
the second empirical part, I construct human rights networks of local and regional groups and 
conduct social network analysis to assess their position in the networks. I argue that even 
though regional human rights organizations were not organizing protests, they were supporting 
activism and democratization with information, legal aid, and panels for discussion, and direct 
dealing with the government. I further find that regional groups are central actors in the 
Egyptian human rights network, which has grown since before the revolution, with a bigger 
variety of organizations and connections. "
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“Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to 
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of 
law.”  
- Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
 
1.0 : INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“The people want to bring down the regime.” On January 25, 2011, the Egyptian people 
chanted in unison for the end of the repressive 30-year regime of Hosni Mubarak. Over the next 
18 days of protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, and across the country, Egyptians demanded 
change. They demanded the end of the authoritarian regime, and of the litany of human rights 
abuses by the state. Egypt had been plagued with massive economic inequality that increased 
with the adoption of neoliberal economic policies in the 1970’s. Criticisms of the Mubarak 
regime largely centered on that inequality and the regime’s widespread human rights violations; 
the state used torture, unlawful detainment, military trials of civilians, repressed political 
participation, censorship, denial of religious rights, and targeted violence and intimidation to 
those critical of the regime, like journalists, activists, and Islamists. Across the region, the greater 
Arab Spring contradicted assumptions by many in both the West and the Arab World that human 
rights have little relevance to the region. It showed the world that the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) was not some “obscure nest of Islamic fundamentalists” but a region of social 
and political diversity, and that its people are willing to take risks to achieve democratic reforms 
and individual rights (Arraiza 2011:47).   
During the Egyptian revolution, civil society actors played key roles in the mobilization 
of protestors (Nasser 2014; El Nawawy and Khamis 2013; Beinin 2014). Since the first 
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independent Egyptian government of Gamal Abdel Nasser, civil society has been heavily 
repressed in Egypt. Human rights organizations (HROs), as the main criticizers of the state, have 
faced problems from harassment to the criminalization of their activities. Still, these 
organizations were active throughout the Arab Spring (Nagger 2012; Cartens 2012). Although 
the repression of HROs is well documented, and some scholars have studied HROs during the 
revolutionary period, we know little about the activities of transnational HROs during the 
Egyptian revolution, nor do we understand how local and transnational groups networked with 
one another.  
In this research, I specifically focus on the activities of regional human rights groups 
headquartered in Cairo during Egyptian revolution. Regional HROs are distinct because they are 
both local and transnational.1 They organize in Egypt at the grassroots level, but unlike local 
rights groups, their organizational efforts and bodies of work are centered not just on Egypt, but 
on other Arab countries as well. Focusing on regional HROs can reveal ways they might differ 
from local and other international organizations, and can investigate how regional groups have 
worked to establish human rights norms and consciousness in Egypt. My main research question 
asks, what is the role of regional human rights organizations during the Egyptian revolution? My 
sub-questions include: what activities do regional rights groups partake in during the revolution? 
Are these groups instrumental in mobilizing protestors? How do regional HROs engage with the 
government and the Egyptian people? Are regional human rights organizations powerful actors 
in Egyptian civil society and human rights networks? How have Egyptian human rights networks 
changed since the revolution?   
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1 Although some use the words transnational, international, and global interchangeably, each of these terms imply 
different things. ‘Transnational’ here emphasizes their work across countries, transcending borders. In comparison, 
‘international’ emphasizes nations and borders. ‘Global’ usually denotes the whole globe, or at least across more 
than two regions.  
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Broadly, this research seeks to contribute to an understanding of the relationships 
between revolution, civil society, and human rights across local and transnational spheres of 
society. This research aims to offer an understanding of how transnational organizations work 
amidst extreme repression and social and political changes. This study also reflects on the role of 
regional groups in local networking, shedding light on the global human rights movement in 
Egypt. I consider the ways that regional groups may bridge the divides between the local and the 
global. This research also adds to existing knowledge about the challenges faced by the human 
rights movement and civil society actors in Egypt. Finally, this work demonstrates that despite 
extreme challenges and repression, human rights organizing is still active in the Arab World. 
Before moving forward, I briefly identify different types of organizations I discuss 
throughout the thesis, also summarized in Figure 1. First, non-governmental organizations, or 
NGOs, are organizations with individuals as members; they operate outside of the government 
and private sector. Scholars differentiate NGOs in various ways based on their aims, 
membership, and outreach. Some organizations are interest groups, primarily working to bring 
together individuals with common interests. Alternatively, social movement organizations, or 
SMOs, are NGOs that organize for social change. A SMO is “a complex, or formal, organization 
which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and 
attempts to implement these goals” (Zald and McCarthy 1979:2).  Human rights organizations 
(HROs) make up a large share of SMOs.  
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   Figure 1: Hierarchy of NGOs with Examples 
 
If we look at the ‘division of labor’ within the world of SMOs, we can further 
characterize them based on where they organize. Local SMOs have members in just one or two 
countries, whereas transnational SMOs (TSMOs) organize across at least three countries. 
Transnational TSMOs may organize across regions of the world, like Greenpeace, which 
involves over 40 countries across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Other TSMOs restrict 
their members to a specific geographic region. These regional groups are the focus of this thesis.   
In what follows, I begin my study with a background of the Egyptian revolution, 
presenting a timeline of the controversial events since January 25th. In the second section, I 
review literature on civil society, global civil society, transnational advocacy networks, and 
Islam and human rights. Then, I present two sets of empirical analysis of the role of regional 
HROs in the Arab Spring. I focus, in particular, on two regional organizations: the Cairo Institute 
for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) and the Arab Network for Human Rights Information 
(ANHRI). In the first part of my study, I use content analysis of newspapers to explore the 
activities of regional HROs. In the second part, I examine the position of these two groups in 
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human rights networks. Acknowledging that these human rights organizations are part of a 
global movement involving local, regional, and international actors, my second chapter considers 
their role in human rights networks. These networks of advocacy cross boundaries of the 
regional and local, in exchange of information and resources for their common goals.  
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2.0: BACKGROUND OF THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION 
 
 
 
 
Inspired by revolution in Tunisia, Egyptians called for mass protest against the Mubarak 
regime. Starting on January 25, 2011, Egyptians protested across the country over the course of 
18 days, ultimately ending with Mubarak stepping down from power. Since then, there have 
been multiple ‘waves’ of revolution, as different actors have competed for power, leaving the 
state fragile and highly unstable.  
I separate the time period into three major ‘waves’. These waves can be understood as 
“exceptional moments” or “moments of madness” that trigger “cycles of protest” (Tarrow 1993). 
These cycles are an increasing and then decreasing wave of interrelated collective action with 
“intensified interactions between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression 
and sometimes revolution” (Tarrow 1993:287). Some elements of these cycles include 
heightened conflict, geographic diffusion, adaptation of social movement organizations, new 
frames of meaning and ideologies, and new forms of collective action. In the Egyptian case, we 
see the overthrow of the regime, followed by a period of military rule, followed by a 
democratically elected Islamist President, followed by a rise of discontent, followed by massive 
protests against the elected President, ending with a military coup d’état. Throughout this 
process, there are moments of heightened conflict and violence, multiple ‘revolutions,’ the rise of 
social movement organizations, ideological battles of secularism and Islamism, and the use of 
the web as a tool for dissent and mobilization.  The general who led the coup, Abdel Fattah Sisi 
is the current President of Egypt; after a brief experiment with democracy, another military 
dictatorship rules Egypt now. These developments reflect the difficulties of revolution and 
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democratization: the persistence of underlying authoritarian patterns, without a true revolution of 
the entire system, can lead to a return to the authoritarianism under a new name. 
 
 
2.1 MARTYRS OF THE ARAB SPRING 
 
The Egyptian Revolution must be understood in the context of a greater collection of 
movements known as the Arab Spring. If we start at the very beginning of these movements, we 
find ourselves in the rural Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid, on December 17, 2010. Tarek al-Tayeb 
Mohamed Bouazizi, a fruit vendor, had an angry confrontation with a municipal official. She 
allegedly slapped him and confiscated his wares (Fahim 2011: 1). Bouazizi, in anger, went to the 
local municipality building, demanding to meet with an official and acquire his goods. They 
refused to see him. He returned shortly with recently acquired petrol, asking, “how do you expect 
me to make a living?” before setting himself on fire in front of stunned eyewitnesses. This act--
Bouazizi's public and emotional self-immolation--is the perceived 'spark' that began the Arab 
Spring.  
His public and defiant act had an immediate ripple effect, with protests beginning as the 
ambulance took him away. Tear gas was used to quell the protests, but they only grew and 
branched out to neighboring towns. Copycat acts of protest, modeled after Bouazizi, began 
springing up throughout Tunisia and even in Egypt (Zayad 2011). Less than ten days after 
Bouazizi's self-immolation, the protests had spread to the capital city of Tunis, calling for the end 
of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's 23-year oppressive regime. On the 28th, amidst protests 
and clashes in the capital, Ben Ali paid a visit to Bouazizi, unconscious since his self-
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immolation, viewed by many as a vain and late attempt to curb criticism of his regime (Arnott 
2011:2). Protests only grew, despite heavy police brutality, and on January 14, 2011, Ben Ali 
resigned and fled to Saudi Arabia. 
Let's rewind a few months. On June 6, 2010, in Alexandria, a young Egyptian 
businessman was sitting in a computer cafe. His name was Khaled Saeed. Two civilian-dressed 
policeman apprehended him and began to beat his head on a marble table, pushing him to the 
ground and dragging his body to the adjacent building. Saeed pleaded for them to stop, asking 
what he had done, but the men continued to beat him until he was dead. Onlookers were present, 
but this sort of police brutality was not unheard of, so no one successfully intervened (Ali 
2012:1). The men reportedly took his lifeless body in their car, but returned shortly and dumped 
his corpse in front of the cafe. An ambulance took him away. The government autopsy officially 
said that Saeed had died of asphyxiation due to swallowing a bag of hashish, a claim dismissed 
as a cover-up of the police brutality and brutal beating of Saeed. Saeed had allegedly possessed a 
video that showed policemen sharing the spoils of a drug bust. 
When Saeed’s family visited the morgue, his brother, Ahmed, took a photograph of his 
badly mangled body, which was quickly uploaded to the internet and further popularized by 
human rights organizations’ discussion of the brutality of Saeed's beating. The photo and story 
circulated quickly on the Internet, where evidence of police brutality, sexual harassment, and 
corruption of the Mubarak regime had been forming over the past few years. The photograph 
went viral, reaching Egyptian Google executive Wael Ghonim, who was living in Dubai. He 
created a Facebook page in memory of Saeed, titled “We are all Khaled Saeed,” gaining 
hundreds and thousands of followers. After protests in Tunisia began, Ghonim used the page to 
popularize a similar movement, choosing January 25 (National Police Day) for a protest in 
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Tahrir Square, in the center of Cairo. Using similar social media mobilization methods as 
previous grassroots Egyptian youth movements Kefaya and 6 April2, word spread across the 
Arab blogosphere and social media of January 25th as a day of protest. Other bloggers and 
activists echoed the sentiment, calling for the end of the regime. The revolution in Egypt had 
begun. 
 
 
2.2 THE FIRST WAVE: THE ’18 DAYS’ 
 
On January 25th, 2011, eleven days after Tunisia’s successful overthrow of longtime 
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, tens of thousands of Egyptians gathered in Cairo’s Tahrir 
(Liberation) Square demanding the end of the regime, and freedom, dignity, and justice. In 
efforts to disperse the crowds, police used tear gas and beat protesters. Protests were not limited 
to Cairo, but also reported in other Egyptian cities like Suez, Alexandria, Aswan, Ismailia, and El 
Mahalla El Kubra. On January 27, the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist party historically 
suppressed by Mubarak, declared their full support of the protests.3 They played a large role in 
mobilizing their supporters to protest in Tahrir (Kirpatrick and Sanger 2011). That same day, 
former director general and Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohammad ElBaradei returned to Egypt 
for the January 28th “Day of Anger” protests, which was announced on a Facebook page, gaining 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
2 Kefaya and 6 April are youth movements that preceded the Arab Spring. Kefaya, or the Egyptian Movement for 
Change, was a grassroots coalition of Egyptians against Mubarak’s presidency that began in 2004. 6 April was an 
activist group supporting workers planning to strike in the spring of 2008 in the industrial town of El-Mahalla El 
Kubra, and later organized around other political issues against Mubarak. Both of these groups were seen as playing 
a leading role in the January 25 revolution.   
3 Since the Muslim Brotherhood’s founding in 1928, they have been the major opposition of the Egyptian 
government, but have risen in popularity with the revival of Islamism in Egypt. 
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more than 55,000 supporters in less than 24 hours. In a futile attempt to squash activist 
networking, Mubarak shut down the Internet and cellphone systems entirely the night of the 27th.  
On January 28th, the “Day of Anger,” protesters met, by the hundreds of thousands, in 
Tahrir, practically an all-out war. Police fired tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons into 
crowds during violent clashes between authorities and protesters throughout Egypt. A curfew 
was announced by police but was widely ignored. As the clashes escalated, deadly police tactics 
further provoked angry protestors, leading to police stations across Egypt being torched; the 
Egyptian police force became severely compromised (Shenker 2011). Mubarak ordered military 
troops to the streets to reinforce struggling police forces; however, protestors noted the 
reluctance of the military to shoot at protestors, with some chanting, “We want the military to 
protect us! The police are beating us,” and others yelling, “The army and the people are one 
hand!”  
The following day on January 29, police withdrew from the streets. “Egyptian President 
Hosni Mubarak dismissed his government but gave no sign in a defiant national television 
address early Saturday that he would be driven from office by widespread protests that have 
shaken his security forces, killed at least 25 people and left spirals of smoke across the capital” 
(Fleishman and Hassan 2011:1). Mubarak, who had been grooming his son Gamal for the 
presidency, appointed head of Egyptian intelligence, Omar Suleiman, as his first ever Vice 
President and former Aviation Minister Ahmad Shafiq as prime minister in an attempt to diffuse 
the situation and name a predecessor.  
On January 31st, a key event of the revolution occurred, when the Egyptian army 
announced that it would not use force against the people, effectively siding with the protestors. 
By this point, more than 300 people had died across Egypt. By February 1st, the protests had only 
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grown, with protesters calling for a “March of a Million,” to Mubarak’s Presidential Palace. 
Over one million protestors gathered in central Cairo that afternoon, with that number doubling 
by the end of the day. That evening, Mubarak spoke to the Egyptian people again, this time 
proclaiming he would not step down but would not run in the next presidential elections, and 
pledged to implement reforms. The protests dwindled slightly, though many protestors had 
remained in the square, camping out overnight (Chivers and Henderson 2011).  
On February 2nd, pro-Mubarak thugs armed with swords, whips, and knives on horses and 
camels entered Tahrir Square in an attempt to disperse protestors. This would later become 
known as the Battle of the Camel. Widespread reports showed that Mubarak was using ‘hired 
muscle,’ especially exploiting the closing of banks to offer money to cash-starved Egyptians to 
side against the anti-Mubarak protestors (Kirpatrick and Fahim 2011). Open fire and Molotov 
cocktails were used on protestors, leaving 836 injured and 5 dead. ElBaradei called for army 
intervention, but stressed they would not talk to the government until Mubarak’s resignation.  
On February 3rd, in an interview with Christiane Amanpour, Mubarak claimed he would 
like to step down, but would not, in fear of Egypt sinking into chaos and the Muslim 
Brotherhood taking advantage of it. However, US policymakers warned Mubarak that US aid to 
Egypt would be cut off if Mubarak did not step down. Facebook groups termed February 4th the 
Day of Departure, hoping Mubarak would step down, especially with international pressure. Two 
million Egyptians flooded Tahrir Square for Friday prayers. Egyptian Christians formed a human 
chain around those praying to show solidarity. The desired result of departure did not occur, 
though. On February 10th, almost 3,000 lawyers marched from the Egyptian Lawyer’s syndicate 
to Mubarak’s Abdeen palace, and about 1,000 physicians in white coats arrived in Tahrir Square 
to thunderous applause. This exemplified the widespread appeal of the revolution; it crossed 
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lines of social class and other demographics that had previously divided Egypt. That evening, 
Mubarak announces he would hand all powers to his newly appointed Vice President Suleiman, 
but would not step down. People chanted, “Leave! Leave! Leave!” after his speech, shocked that 
he had not resigned despite murmurs and reports that he would (Michael 2011).  
However, in a turn of events, on February 11th, Vice President Suleiman announced at 6 
PM local time that Mubarak had finally resigned, after 18 days of mass protests. The power of 
the moment in Tahrir when Suleiman announces Mubarak resignation cannot be represented 
easily in words. There are documentary films that track Egypt’s 18 days of revolution that 
exhibit well the pure elation of protestors camped out in Tahrir (see Tahrir: Liberation Square, 
2011 and The Square, 2013). Jubilant celebrations of a successful overthrow of a 30-year regime 
followed, but the power shift from the regime to the military left Egypt’s future in a state of 
uncertainty—would the Egyptian military make moves towards the democratization for which 
the protestors fought? 
2.3 THE SECOND WAVE: TRANSITIONAL MILITARY RULE 
In Vice President Suleiman’s speech, he announced that Mubarak relinquished all powers 
to the military. This wave saw the rise of power of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF), in Egypt. The SCAF’s strategic decision to side with the protestors put them in charge 
of the transitional period. Said (2012) views this as paradoxical for two reasons. First, the SCAF 
constituted a significant part of the state’s political power; they were an important part of the 
ruling regime and the ruling class that governed Egypt (Said 2012:397). Second, the SCAF, as a 
military institution “is based on hierarchy, strict regulation, and obedience,” and this institution 
“has been left responsible in leading the transition to democracy” (Said 2012:398). 
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  On February 13, the military dissolved Parliament and suspended the constitution. They 
rejected the demands of pro-democracy protestors for a quick transfer of power to a civilian and 
democratic administration; instead, they stated they would rule by marital law until the upcoming 
elections in six months or later. They requested that all protestors clear Tahrir Square, sending in 
troops to ensure their removal by tearing down tents and harassing those who refused to leave; 
clashes ensued with activists who refused to vacate the square until the demands of the 
revolution were met. It is within these clashes that the military performed ‘virginity tests,’ in the 
Egyptian Museum, “the military’s crude euphemism for sexual assault” (Gaber 2014:3)4. There 
were clashes between the military and protestors who refused to leave the square until 
democracy was delivered.  Since the overthrow of Mubarak, there were two major ‘factions’ 
within Egyptian’s revolutionaries—those who believe that the revolution continues, hoping for a 
radical redefinition of the system entirely, and those who desire reforms and stability.  
The military set the vote for constitutional amendments that would increase democratic 
safeguards and establish elections for March 19. Many Egyptians were distressed by the rapidity 
of the vote; political life in Egypt had been repressed for 30 years, and few opposition parties, 
except for Mubarak’s National Democratic Party and the previously underground Muslim 
Brotherhood, had organized and unified goals. Some worried that the election would favor the 
well-organized Islamist groups, while others cited concerns over how waiting too long would 
allow the military to maintain their power (Slackman 2011). The referendum passed by about 
70%, and many Egyptians eagerly awaited the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections 
promised to them at the end of the year. 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
4 Virginity testing is the process of determining whether a female is a virgin. Egyptian military forces performed 
virginity tests on women detained during the 2011 Egyptian revolution. It said the tests were carried out in order to 
refute claims that the women had been raped while in detention.   
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The SCAF, meanwhile, partially reorganized the state apparatus, but much had been 
maintained within Mubarak’s “deep state, ” an assortment of long-standing political and 
bureaucratic forces against democracy. Recognizing this, protests against military rule 
throughout Egypt continued. At this time, Egypt witnessed grave escalations of the violent 
crackdown on protests, often through the same repressive methods of their predecessor Mubarak 
(HRW 2012). In November, Amnesty International lamented the broken promises of the SCAF, 
in a review of the human rights abuses since the fall of the regime. Their report suggested that 
human rights abuses under military leaders were worse than those of the Mubarak regime:  
The SCAF has arbitrarily restricted the very human rights, including freedom of 
expression, association and assembly, that are instrumental to ensuring free debate of 
social and political issues. Criticism of the authorities or of the pace of reform has been 
ruthlessly suppressed. Military courts have imprisoned thousands of civilians. Military 
prosecutors have summonsed, interrogated and ordered the detention of those who 
criticize the army. Military forces have used unnecessary or excessive force to disperse 
demonstrations. The euphoria of the uprising has been replaced by fears that one 
repressive rule has simply been replaced with another (Amnesty International 2011:5). 
 
One example of the aggressive measures that army leaders used is the referring of civilians to 
military trials; the average estimated number of civilians prosecuted before military courts during 
the first year of transition was between 12,000 and 15,000 citizens. By contrast, the total number 
of civilians tried before military courts in 30 years under Mubarak was only about 3,000 
citizens” (Said 2012:413).  
In late 2011 and early 2012, Egyptians voted in several rounds for the lower and upper 
houses of parliament. Coalitions of civil society groups monitored the elections. The results were 
a resounding Islamist majority, most dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood’s newly established 
political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Uncertainty at the results of the elections 
centered on two aspects: the Islamist majoritarianism and the SCAF’s constitutional declarations 
that had already diminished the power of the new parliament. But it was clear that once a new 
 15 
president would be sworn in, the military’s formal role and influence would reduce significantly, 
especially in the creation of a new constitution (Said 2012:414). In May of 2012, Egyptian voters 
were summoned to the polls to choose their presidential candidates. After much political 
infighting between Islamist and secularist factions, and the exclusion of leading candidates on 
“obscure or questionable grounds,” Egyptians in June had a choice between Mohamed Morsi of 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular Ahmed Shafik, a military holdover of the Mubarak 
regime. Morsi won by a narrow margin; Morsi took 51.7% of the vote versus 48.3% for Shafik. 
On June 30, 2012, Mohammad Morsi, an engineer-turned politician (former member of 
Parliament from 2000-2005) was the first democratically elected President of Egypt. He was also 
the first Islamist elected as a head of an Arab state. 
 
 
2.4 THE THIRD WAVE: DISENCHANTMENT OF MORSI’S GOVERNMENT 
 
 Morsi pledged to complete the revolution’s course and reclaim his powers from the 
military. Concurrent to elections, the SCAF had sprung a new constitutional declaration that 
disbanded the lower house of parliament, “robbed the presidency of significant power, and 
carved out a strong role for the military in the constitution writing process then underway” 
(Brown 2013:48). Once Morsi was elected, he worked to reverse these steps, and in the process 
increased the powers of the presidency, leaving his authority unchecked. By November, claiming 
fears of a military counter-revolution, Morsi removed the issue of the constituent assembly5 and 
other executive matters from judicial review, inspiring widespread public unrest. In this way, 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
5 The Egyptian Constituent Assembly was the committee for the creation of a new Constitution of Egypt. 
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Morsi asserted his absolute presidential power until a constitution was created, effectively 
putting him above the law.  
In December, amidst protests throughout the Nile Delta provinces against the Muslim 
Brotherhood, culminating in Brotherhood regional offices being set on fire, Egyptians returned to 
the polls to vote for their constitution. But, the turnout was considerably low due to boycotts by 
Brotherhood opponents who showed considerable discontentment with the new constitution, 
which they said favored Islamists and autocratic rule (Abdelaziz 2012). In contrast, supporters of 
the constitution viewed their vote as a vote for stability. On December 22, 2012, 63.8% of 
Egyptians voted in favor of the new controversial draft constitution, with a large minority, 
mainly secularists and urban Egyptians, disapproving of the move.  
Morsi’s all-inclusive powers were voided when the new constitution was adopted, but the 
Egyptians had become increasingly critical of Morsi’s authoritarian and Islamist tendencies. 
Rising tensions between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and anti-Morsi protestors began to rise 
across Egypt. A new youth movement, Tamarod (rebellion in Arabic) began to spread a petition 
for Morsi to step down, claiming more than 22 million signatures (El Deeb 2013). During that 
spring of 2013, a short political crisis ensued, when the state was working to organize the new 
parliamentary elections for the previously disbanded (by the SCAF) lower house of parliament. 
However, elections never occurred due to a different kind of political crisis, a political crisis 
would bring the entire system down with it.  
For seven months, protestors accused Morsi of authoritarianism and pushing an Islamist 
agenda. With the help of social movements coalitions such as Tamarod and 6 April, activists 
began to massively mobilize protestors against Morsi. They launched the 30 June Front to 
organize Egyptians against the Morsi regime. They supported the continuing the path of the 
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January 25 Revolution, largely viewing the aftermath of January 25th as flawed and riddled with 
democratic mistakes. On June 30, 2013, on the anniversary of Morsi’s inauguration, millions of 
Egyptians took to the streets demanding the immediate end of Morsi’s presidency, unwilling to 
wait until the end of his term to elect a new president. Protesters staged sit-ins chanting against 
Morsi, “Down, down with the rule of the Morshed (Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood)” 
and “He will leave, we won't leave”. These protests were reportedly larger than the January 25 
Revolutionary protests that had, more than three years ago, ended the repressive Mubarak regime 
(Alexander 2013). They began peacefully, but in the course of a few days had become 
increasingly violent, as Muslim Brotherhood supporters were targeted heavily by angry 
protestors. On July 2nd, the military sided again with the protestors, warning Morsi that he should 
respond to protestors’ demands or expect a forced removal. Despite their strong language, Morsi 
remained persistent, asserting his democratic legitimacy and even claiming he would rather die 
than step down to the military.  
On July 3, the military rewarded the protestors with a military coup. General Abdel 
Fattah el-Sisi, head of the Egyptian military, announced that Morsi was deposed and detained. 
Many Egyptians deemed this as a second revolution, the June 30 Revolution. The Egyptian 
military assumed leadership of Egypt again. Once again, the Muslim Brotherhood became illegal 
in Egypt, deemed a terrorist organization. Following these events was a period of violent unrest, 
mostly involving clashes between security forces and pro-Morsi Muslim Brotherhood supporters. 
August of 2013 saw a huge crackdown on pro-Morsi supporters through raids by security forces. 
In a horrifying event, on August 14, 2013, Egyptian security forces raided two camps of 
protestors in Cairo at al-Nahda Square and at Rabaa al-Adawiya Square, massacring around a 
thousand demonstrators (and injuring 4,000) in what Human Rights Watch called “one of the 
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world’s largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history” (Human Rights Watch 
2014). On 24 March 2014, an Egyptian court sentenced 529 members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood to death on charges of attacking police. By May 2014, approximately 16,000 
Brotherhood members or supporters had been imprisoned. 
General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi became a national hero, gaining massive popularity post-
coup, what some coin “Sisi-mania.” He suspended the constitution and on January 18, 2014, 
Egyptians returned to the polls and endorsed an amended constitution, which emphasized 
curtailing of religious language and safeguarded the military’s autonomy. Sisi declared his 
candidacy for president in the 2014 elections, winning on May 30, 2014 with 23.78 million or 
almost 97% of votes. After more than four years of revolution, the Egyptian government had 
returned to a military dictatorship. 
Throughout this revolutionary time period, the use of human rights discourse was a major 
characteristic of the protestor’s demands. However, little research has been done on the work of 
the Egyptian human rights movement, and its major actors, human rights NGOs in the process of 
the revolution. Human rights organizations had challenged the corporatist and repressive strategy 
of the state for years, so their role warrants further study. Furthermore, the scholarship on 
transnational ties and the revolution is also lacking. My work seeks to understand the role of 
transnational rights groups, specifically regional groups, in the process of the revolution. 
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3.0: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 Through this literature review, I seek to educate the reader on the various themes and 
context of my work, paying special attention to major challenges to human rights in the region 
and in the Egyptian case. I begin my work with discussions of civil society and transnational 
networking, and then apply this to the Egyptian case, with a discussion of challenges to 
transnationalism in the MENA, restrictive state-civil society relations in Egypt, and the ‘foreign 
funding debate’ plaguing Egyptian civil society. By explaining the challenges to civil society and 
human rights in Egypt, I hope to give the reader a context to the limited civil and transnational 
society in Egypt and the struggles human rights culture faces in Egypt.  
 
 
3.1 CIVIL SOCIETY, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND TRANSNATIONAL 
ADVOCACY NETWORKS 
 
I begin with a discussion of the meaning and importance of civil society, which scholars 
have been studying civil society for two centuries. Alexis de Tocqueville was one of the first to 
famously reflect on what he called ‘civil associations’: a sphere of non-political civil 
organizations that encourages citizens to think collectively rather than strictly individually. He 
viewed civil society as integral to promoting democracy and avoiding despotism (de Tocqueville 
1835). This definition of civil society emphasizes on the connection between civil society and 
democracy. Putnam (1993) confirms de Tocqueville’s argument in Making Democracy Work, in 
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which he argues that democratic government is strengthened by social capital, or cooperation on 
shared objectives through social networking between people. Civil society, for Putnam, allows 
the free flow of social capital and influences citizen engagement with their governments. 
Scholars consider Putnam and de Tocqueville’s definition as “Civil Society I” (Foley and 
Edwards 1996:38). A second definition for civil society exists; civil society is considered a 
sphere of action, independent of the state, which is capable of energizing resistance against a 
tyrannical regime (Kuron 1974; Michnik 1976).  They conclude that civil society is a network of 
interlocking social movements that reject the state’s monopoly on power in public life. Both of 
these definitions are key to this research project; understanding civil society as both a place of 
opposition to the authoritarian state and a key ingredient to true democratization affirms its 
importance in discussion of revolution.  
Organizations formed by people in the sphere of civil society are known as civil society 
organizations (CSOs) or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and are viewed as institutions 
that operate outside the state and the market. They are the key actors within civil society. These 
institutions encompass a wide variety of groups: advocacy groups, charities, religious 
organizations, sports groups, professional associations, and clubs.  
The concept of civil society arose in the analysis of national politics, but with 
globalization having dramatically blurred the line between the domestic and the international, we 
are seeing the concept applied on the global level. Global civil society is defined in the first 
Global Civil Society Yearbook as “the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organizations, 
networks, and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market and operating 
beyond the confines of national societies, polities, and economies” (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 
2001:12). The discussion of this new global domain is a reflection of the rise of a transnational 
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sphere of social and political participation – emerging most notably in the ’80s and ’90s – in 
which individuals, groups, and social movements engage in a dialogue with each other and 
various government actors (Anheier et al. 2001). As the Cold War came to an end, transnational 
civil society expanded. Social movements spread beyond borders; across the globe, activist 
networking and cross-national agenda building grew and organizations focusing on human 
rights, peace, the environment, and social justice proliferated (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 
1997). International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), like Doctors Without Borders, and 
transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs), like Greenpeace, are the major actors in 
global civil society, often interacting with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), like the 
United Nations, which also tended to expand at the same time. INGOs and TSMOs differ 
because INGOs can organize internationally on any given issue, like the Eurogroup for Animals, 
and TSMOs organize internationally on social movement issues, like the Arab Women’s 
Solidarity Association. 
Aside from documenting the growth of global civil society, researchers have been 
interested in how different types of actors in global civil society work together. Keck and 
Sikkink (1999) discuss the structure of interactions in global civil society in network terms. 
Transnational advocacy networks, or TANs, are networks of activists working together based on 
principled ideas. TANs are made up of a variety of actors, including international and domestic 
NGOs, local social movements, foundations, media, churches, trade unions, and parts of regional 
and international IGOs (Keck and Sikkink 1999:89). Though not traditionally viewed as 
powerful players in international politics, these networks are growing in influence and 
transforming world politics, by building new links among actors and offering further 
opportunities for dialogue and exchange. Groups in TANs exchange information, services, and 
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funds with one another; their most valuable currency is their ability to generate information 
quickly and rapidly (Keck and Sikkink 1999:92). Networking between these organizations leads 
to cooperation and resource exchanges, strengthening activists’ abilities to produce social change 
on shared issues (Smith 2008:45). TANs are particularly important in “value laden debates over 
human rights, the environment, women, infant health, and indigenous peoples” (Keck and 
Sikkink 1999:91).  
TANs often use the language of ‘rights,’ and because governments are paradoxically the 
primary guarantors and violators of rights, TANs often intend to influence the behavior of states 
specifically (Keck and Sinkkink 1999:93). Their goal is to create a ‘boomerang pattern;’ when 
the citizens of a country cannot effectively persuade a government to initiate change, they may 
be able to motivate their international allies to bring pressure on the states from the outside. The 
boomerang pattern is common in human rights campaigns, where individuals or organizations in 
repressive contexts are empowered by global human rights discourse, but when faced with 
impunity, turn to their international contacts to echo their demands, ‘shaming’ the country’s lack 
of respect for global human rights norms. International networking and cooperation between 
social movement organizations contributes to establishing human rights as norms of the 
international system, norms that are some of the most powerful tools in the movement for global 
human rights.  
TANs use political tactics to influence the world system. Keck and Sinkkink (1999) 
identify four types of politics that TANs utilize: information politics, symbolic politics, leverage 
politics, and accountability politics. They view the gathering of information as the strongest tool 
of TANs, who use credible information to mobilize people towards joint action. Information 
often includes expert technical or statistical information along with personal testimonies to 
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emphasize the human reality of a situation (Keck and Sinkkink 1999:96). Symbolic politics 
involves the linking of ideas or events to mobilize people and reshape understandings. TANs 
have a limited ability to change things on their own, so they use leverage politics to pressure 
more powerful actors to influence state practices directly. This leverage can be in material or 
moral form; that is, through linking causes to things that people value, or through the 
‘mobilization of shame.’ Once a government has committed itself to a principle, TANs can use 
accountability politics to expose the distance between their rhetoric and practice, embarrassing 
governments who do not live up to their word (Keck and Sinkkink 1999:97). 
This rise of transnational activism is understood as a global trend. However, it is 
important to note that it not “broadly representative of and accessible to all of the world’s 
citizens” (Smith and Wiest 2005:622). There is an “uneven geography” of transnational 
organizing, which is concentrated in the global North, favoring countries with not only greater 
resources but also freer access to political and economic institutions. Economic globalization has 
been a major influence in other areas of globalization, but may not be the primary driving force 
behind the growth of global civil society. Looking primarily at TSMOs, Smith and Wiest 
disprove the belief that for poorer countries, global economic integration drives other forms of 
transnational interaction. They find that TSMO membership is generally higher in countries with 
structured participation in the world polity, through organizations and treaties (Smith and Wiest 
2005:638).  
In my work, I demonstrate the small number of TSMOs headquartered in the Arab 
World. This thesis examines a specific subgroup of TSMOs, regional human rights groups, 
headquartered in Egypt. This work also focuses on constructing a reversal of the traditional 
understanding of TANs which portrays the networks of transnational groups with other groups in 
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the international system; my human rights networks are transnational groups working within 
local contexts and with local organizations and networks.  
 
 
3.2 TRANSNATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
 
Following the trend of the rise of these global networks of activism, the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region should have seen an increase in transnational human rights 
advocacy during this time period, but this was curtailed (Wiest 2007). In A Story of Two 
Transnationalisms: Global Salafi Jihad and Transnational Human Rights Mobilization in the 
Middle East and North Africa, Wiest (2007) considers the reasons for a lack of transnational 
human rights activism in the MENA. Her answer lies in a concurrent and oppositional force in 
the Middle East—the Global Salafi Jihadist movement. This is a separate entity from the 
Political Islam, or moderate Islamist movement, which seeks a state governed by Islamic law. 
Global Salafi Jihadists are against democracy and are fundamentalist in their interpretations of 
Islam; their methods are usually violent. At the end of the Cold War, the MENA saw a period of 
political liberalization that established the associational structures “that were necessary for 
anchoring both types of movements in their respective societies” (Wiest 2007:138). As the 
militancy and influence of Islamic Jihad groups grew in the 90’s, so did the justification for state 
repression of civil society, severely inhibiting human rights activism. In authoritarian regimes, 
this often leads to activists pursuing further global alliances on the topic of human rights, 
viewing it as a source of empowerment against their authoritarian regimes. However, in 
particularly repressive regimes, like those in the MENA, activists have trouble bypassing the 
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state to utilize these networks (Wiest 2007: 141). In short, MENA countries utilize anti-terrorism 
as a justification for the suppression of social and political rights, to the detriment of global 
human rights networking.  
This appears true in the case of Egypt: anti-terror legislation passed in 1992 utilized the 
terrorism threat to national security to restrict the activities of civil society. That same year, the 
state closed or nationalized tens of thousands of private mosques. 1992 was the most violent year 
Egypt had for some time; terrorist attacks skyrocketed. Under anti-terrorism legislation, the state 
used legal and extralegal forces to suppress anti-state activity, especially the activity of the 
popular Islamist group the Muslim Brotherhood. A 1995 assassination attempt on Mubarak 
further increased suppression of human rights organizations (Wiest 2007:152). In 2000, 
celebrated sociologist and activist Saad Ibrihim was detained and his NGOs, the Ibn Khaldoun 
Center for Development Studies and the Huda Sharawi Center for Women Voters were 
subsequently closed. When brought to court, Ibrihim was convicted of receiving foreign funding, 
disseminating false information abroad, and misusing funds. The charges were false and 
politically motivated, due to his use of foreign financial support for his organizations (Hicks 
2002). This vilification of foreign funds and cooperation continues to be a concern for civil 
society organizations in Egypt, as I will show below. 
The lack of civil society activity and networking has had lasting repercussions for the 
adoption of human rights norms in Egyptian society. Hafner-Burton and Tsutisi (2005) have 
demonstrated that international NGO participation—not, as previously believed, state ratification 
of human rights law and treaties—positively influence the protection of human rights. Surely 
every MENA nation has ratified at least one international human rights treaty. “Although we find 
that institutionalization of global human rights has no systematically positive impact through the 
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treaty system, we also find that global human rights norms, embedded in the treaties but 
proffered by international civil society, do contribute to real improvements in human rights 
practices” (Haftner-Burton and Tsutisi 2005:1398). In short, they find that increased INGO 
membership can and does influence states to change their human rights practices for the better. A 
more established transnational advocacy network could have had broad effects on the Arab 
Spring social movements. The Arab Spring, though regional in nature, was “notably 
characterized by a lack of transnational civil networks that would be able to cross borders of the 
Muslim World” (Marchetti 2011:22). In this thesis, I hope to elucidate how human rights 
networks of advocacy have changed since the revolution; in Chapter 5, I examine Egyptian 
human rights TANs pre-and post-revolution.  
 
 
3.3 STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS IN EGYPT 
 
In order to understand the limited activity of human rights organizing in Egypt, it is 
imperative to consider the broader political environment. State suppression of civil society is 
perhaps the most influential force in limiting the success of the human rights movement. This 
suppression was formally instituted via two major methods: the Emergency Laws of 1981 and 
the restrictive NGO laws enforced by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA). Drawing from 
these laws, the state also uses physical harassment and intimidation, punitive penal measures, 
and administrative restrictions to limit the work of NGOs.  
 Egypt’s Emergency Law, instated in 1981 at the assassination of former President Anwar 
Sadat, is an important tool of the authoritarian regime and central to the human rights debate in 
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Egypt more broadly. The Emergency Law is renewed every three years, suspending the rights 
guaranteed by the Egyptian constitution, giving the government all-encompassing power to limit 
basic freedoms. This power includes, but is not limited to: arresting civilians and detaining them 
without trial, trying civilians in military courts, prohibiting political organizing, and censoring 
media for national security reasons (Ibrahim, Lachant, and Nahas 2003:9). The laws’ effects 
devastate political and social organizing, influencing the way activists organize and the subjects 
of their discussion, out of fear of their personal safety.  
  Beginning under Nasser, the Egyptian state consistently instated restrictive NGO laws to 
curtail the power of civil society. Nasser’s 1956 law required NGOs to register with MOSA, 
provided MOSA the power to disband any organization deemed a threat to national security, and 
barred international funding of NGOs. Since 1956, Egypt has passed three other laws 1964, 
1999, and 2002 which regulate NGOs, each one more restrictive than the last (Pollock 2013:15).  
Since 1956, NGOs have tried to avoid registering with MOSA, since the government 
would then be able to surveil and track organizational activity, giving State Security control over 
their affairs. In 1988, the director of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies found a 
legal loophole in the Constitution that allowed groups to register as civil companies and avoid 
MOSA registration (Mousatafa 2009:152). Many HROs followed suit in the 1990s and 2000s, 
though many organizations, such as the Arab Women’s Solidarity Association, headed by 
renowned Egyptian feminist Nawal El-Sa'dawi, still had to close their doors (Moussa 2011:249).  
In 2002, the loophole allowing NGOs to avoid MOSA registration was closed with the 
passing of Law-84. Established with no consultation of NGOs and sparse public debate and press 
coverage (Ibrahim et.al 2003), Law-84 obligates NGOs registered as civil companies to reapply 
and register, effectively closing the operational space that NGOs had made for themselves 
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through the loophole (Cartens 2012:60). As usual, it prevents NGOs from engaging in politics 
but newly requires NGO to: submit minutes of annual meetings to the ministry, obtain 
permission for foreign funds, provide authorities with detailed accounting, and gain approval for 
prospective board members. The government still enforces Law-84, established with no 
consultation of NGOs and sparse public debate or press coverage (Ibrahim et.al 2003). In 
practice, MOSA has used the law to routinely reject NGO registration, especially those involved 
with human rights. Organizations not formally registered or rejected by MOSA run the risk of 
closure at any time (Sabra 2006:4), and violators of the law can face imprisonment or up to four 
thousand dollars in fines. There are far-reaching implications of this law for organization 
practices, activities, and resource mobilization, forcing HROs to contend with the very 
bureaucracy that they are hoping to change. Coalitions of NGOs across Egypt have repeatedly 
written joint statements against Law 84, but to no avail.  
The Arab Spring in Egypt led to a lifting of the emergency powers law, but has left Law-
84 intact. Despite promises of reform, successive governments have suggested five updated 
NGO laws, “none of which meet international standards for the right of freedom of association” 
(Human Rights Watch 2005:2). Moreover, the Egyptian government has continued to use Law-
84 to suppress NGOs. For example, on June 4, 2013, the Morsi government convicted 43 NGO 
workers (16 of them American) for operating without a license and receiving foreign funding. 
President Sisi has requested that all NGOs register according to the 2002 law or face legal 
problems or imprisonment. 
The regional HROs in my study are subject to the intense scrutiny of MOSA, which 
greatly restricts their work. In the Mubarak era, Egyptian civil society had been internally 
fragmented and systematically weakened by these restrictions and utilization of the security 
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apparatus to punish activists. This will have real effects on their ability to network with other 
HROs. 
 
 
3.4 A NEW GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM: THE RISE OF KIFAYA AND 6 APRIL 
 
Clearly, the restrictive laws on civil society have influenced the ability of HROs to do 
their work and influence social change. However, an interesting side effect of the increasingly 
restricted operational space of HROs in Egypt due to Law 84/2002 is the rise of non-
organizational social movement groups. Cartens (2012) argues:  
[The] rise of social movements from the start of the 2000s can be seen as a 
proactive response to the restrictions on the human rights arena. Thus, human 
rights activists were able to create space by, actually leaving the deadlocked 
human rights arena. It were these human rights activists that stood, together with 
many others, at Tahrir Square on the 25th of January and onwards (68).  
 
Due to major political events like the 2nd Palestinian Intifada and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
this era also saw an increase of regional activism and also within Egypt. Because of increased 
restrictions, activists began to work in more radical ways to influence social change. In Egypt, 
we see the rise of two major SMOs in this time period: Kifaya and 6 April.  
Kifaya, which means ‘Enough’ in Arabic, is also known as the Egyptian Movement for 
Change. Kifaya first emerged in 2004 and was initiated and led by a politically diverse group of 
intellectuals, professionals, and students and found support among the working class (McNally 
2013: 417). Rather than strictly using human rights discourse to criticize the regime, Kifaya 
demanded the outright end of Mubarak’s repressive rule. 6 April was a youth movement 
established in 2008 in support of a worker’s strike on April 6th in El-Mahalla El-Kubra. They 
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worked to petition against the restrictive Egyptian protest law. These two groups were 
responsible for a major shift in the political space, mobilizing strategies, and discourse of anti-
regime movements. The use of the Internet and the street as a major space of contestation were 
characteristics of these new social movements. Both groups organized protests and 
demonstrations online, without a physical headquarters or a meeting place. Kefaya primarily 
used websites, emails, and blogs to organize activists, while 6 April added in the use of social 
media like Facebook and Twitter. 6 April’s group started with 300 Facebook users and grew to 
3,000 in three days. Despite the fact that these movements were unsuccessful in achieving their 
aims, they received national and international attention, and many scholars argue that they paved 
the way for the mass mobilization of the Egyptian Revolution.  
My study focuses on formal transnational human rights organizing, but the importance of 
these SMOs in the lead up to the revolution should not be ignored.  
 
 
3.5 SUPPRESSING CIVIL SOCIETY AND HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH THE 
FOREIGN FUNDING DEBATE 
 
 Formally, the laws I mentioned allow for major restrictions, and even criminalization of 
NGO work. Law 84/2002 states that any NGO must obtain permission before accepting funds 
from any source, whether domestic or foreign. Informally, the state also uses stigmatization and 
negative labeling to restrict the work of NGOs. MENA governments have utilized anti-Western 
rhetoric to “cast human rights as a foreign and un-Islamic tool of Western culture and political 
agendas” (Mokhtari 2012:193). Egyptian civil society organizations rely heavily on foreign 
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funding to achieve their aims. This is especially true of HROs, which face problems related to 
foreign funding due to the political nature of their work (Mokhtari 2012:197). This has presented 
difficulties for the Egyptian human rights movement, due to government restrictions and public 
perceptions of Western involvement in Egyptian state of affairs.  
The state has used media to further the notion that human rights groups are tools of 
Western interference, accentuated by the rising sentiment of anti-Americanism. The media paints 
human rights organizations as “agents of foreign agenda that want to dominate Egypt through the 
process of globalization” (Stachursky 2013:107). For example, in 2010, security agents intensely 
scrutinized the work of organizations like the New Woman Foundation and the Egyptian Centre 
for Economic and Social Rights. Simultaneously, Egyptian media—the semi-official newspaper 
Al-Ahram and the pro-government daily magazine Rosa el-Youssef—began to slander the 
organizations for “pursuing political motives and financial gains from foreign sources” (Pratt 
2006:20). Another example of the kind of language used in smear campaigns for foreign funding 
was in a 2005 copy of the semi-official daily Al-Gomhoria: 
There are evil and malicious motivations behind foreign funding, such as 
corrupting the weak souls of some individuals, funding terrorism, supporting one 
party against another, unsettling the nationalist character of the country, and 
creating divisions in society along sectarian lines…Human rights organizations 
have become a ‘polite’ tool of imperialism which allows the superpowers to 
control the fate of smaller countries and interfere in their domestic affairs through 
encouraging those ‘local’ organizations to reveal (fabricated) human rights 
violations in order to use such claimed violations as a weapon against the 
independence of the weak countries and to threaten them if they challenge the will 
of the new world order (Al Gomhoria 2005, as cited in Pratt 2006). 
 
Coupled with the Egyptian perception of a U.S. double standard (see: Abu Ghraib Prison 
abuses) with regard to human rights—the US “championing human rights when it was expedient 
to do so and retreating when it was not”—these perceptions have only hurt the Egyptian public 
opinion of human rights NGOs (Mokhtari 2012:199). For this reason, some Egyptian HROs, 
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such as the Cairo Institute for Human Rights and the Association for the Freedom of Thought 
and Expression, refuse American foreign support specifically, afraid that it would hurt their 
image (Cartens 2012:54).  
The Egyptian public remains skeptical of global human rights discourse by organizations 
due to their relations with foreign organizations and funding. Throughout the revolution, 
Mubarak, and later the military would utilize language of a “third hand,” an outside foreign 
agenda that would influence Egyptian politics. NGOs were often the face of the third hand, like 
on July 23, 2011, when activists organized a sit-in at the Ministry of Defense and were met with 
military violence. The SCAF aimed to link protests to international organizations that receive 
foreign funding who have suspicious agendas, casting NGOs as a threat to national security 
(Cartens 2012:86).  
 Nicola Pratt analyzes the nuances of the foreign funding debate in Human Rights NGOs 
and the Foreign Funding Debate in Egypt. She argues that the foreign funding debate extends 
the “us and them” perception that Egyptian have with the West (Pratt 2006:3). It is not surprising 
that Egypt has anti-Western perceptions due to the historic oppressive relationship that the state 
has had with Western countries. In the same vein as Edward Said, in his landmark work 
Orientalism (1978), which outlines the West’s constructed and essentialized version of the 
MENA region, we can trace a similarly essentialized version of what is Western when it comes 
to human rights and other liberal ideas. However, like other East/West paradigms, the foreign 
funding debate rarely reflects the objective reality of the situation or any testable evidence on the 
impact of foreign funding on NGOs. Rather, Pratt contends, “it represents a dominant way of 
thinking about or interpreting Egypt’s relations with the ‘West.’ Nevertheless, this discourse 
does not only operate in the realm of ideas about Egypt and the ‘West,’ it also shapes the real 
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practices of the state and civil society towards Egyptian NGOs, thereby illustrating the link 
between discourse and power” (Pratt 2006:6). 
 Though cultural essentialisms dominate the debate, human rights activists themselves 
have struggled with the question of foreign funding, most notably members of the Egyptian 
Organization for Human Rights (Browers 2006). Pratt uses dependency theory to explain the 
rationalization of the debate against foreign funding. Dependency theory, which took off in post-
colonial Latin American scholarship, emphasizes the unequal stream of resources in the world 
system from poor ‘periphery’ countries and developing ‘core countries’ (Bevir 2013). 
 Usually applied to decolonization and the maintenance of neo-colonial relationships, this logic 
carries some weight in discussions of dependency in international and political development. 
Pratt never mentions further scholarship on human rights and dependency, most notably the 
prominent discussion of a ‘human rights dependency,’ popularized by Abdullahi An-Na'im. He 
argues that the increasing internationalization and acceptance of foreign funds of HROs in the 
MENA creates a dependency problem. States are rarely obliged to their local communities for 
the protection of human rights; rather, they are more reactive to the pressure of the international 
community (An-Naim 2001:721). 
International human rights NGOs utilize local NGOs to gain information about human 
rights abuses, but their audiences are increasingly Western activists and policy makers who are 
expected to influence Western governments, pressuring developing countries to protect human 
rights. This sounds similar to the boomerang method of TANs as popularized by Keck and 
Sikkink. An-Na’im considers this problematic because this kind of dependency relationship does 
not consider the politics of global aid (for example, how US aid to Egypt is due to power 
structures centered within US interests) nor the manner in which international organizations tend 
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to deal with human rights abuses: in a reactionary style, rather than a preventative one (An-Naim 
2011:32). An-Naim’s criticisms encompass some of the crises of the human rights regime in 
Egypt and the Arab world. He acknowledges the profound need for a network of dependencies, 
but he believes that “effective and sustainable protection of human rights can only be achieved 
by each society for itself” (An-Naim 2001:703). His emphasis in his essay is on the use of 
national and regional NGOs as a means of diminishing human rights dependency. He does not 
assert that the use of the international system to shame authoritarian governments into greater 
compliance with global human right standards must end, but rather, he asserts that international 
advocacy cannot substitute regional- and local-level NGO activity. An-Naim views regionalism 
as particularly key owing to the cultural and contextual specificity of the region, but he believes 
in balancing this cultural knowledge without undermining the universality of human rights (An-
Naim 2001:722). My research question deals with regional human rights groups, a specific area 
of transnational organizing, in an attempt to understand their special role between local and 
international groups during Egypt’s revolution.  
The use of anti-Western rhetoric, once a source of empowerment against oppression, 
seemingly begins to be used as a method to oppress the work of HROs. The false binary of 
“Western,” and “Egyptian,” only benefits authoritarianism in Egypt. Some have argued that in 
instable post-colonial societies, political elites use nationalism to legitimize their power and seek 
their own interests (Biling 1995:41).  
Egypt, having been the leader of Arab Nationalist movements and a fiercely nationalist 
state in the region, utilizes similar tactics. Maha Abdelrahman asserts that in the Egyptian 
context, globalization has led to challenges to the definition of nationalist discourse. She claims 
that the state’s framing of civil society and the human rights movement as damaging to the 
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Egyptian nation legitimizes the state as upholding the nationalist interest (Abdelrahman 2007). 
The state benefits from framing the discourse as a nationalist struggle against Western and 
foreign values, and this view is popularly held by intellectuals, leftists, and Arab Nationalists. 
Abdelrahman (2007) reminds us that the political memory of foreign oppression by Western 
powers remains fresh in Egyptian minds, to the extent that even those who have concerns for 
human rights find it difficult to tolerate Western intervention in Egypt (290). 
 Negative public perceptions of HROs and Western funding influence their ability to 
openly criticize their societies, for fear of supporting the stereotype of Western or liberal 
influence. Societal pressure influences positions and issues discussed by Egyptian HROs, and for 
these reasons Egyptian HROs avoid discussing controversial stances against the criminalization 
of homosexuality or the banning of books by Islamists (Abdelrahman 2007:294). 
 As I have demonstrated, the foreign funding debate utilizes cultural essentialisms and 
negative perceptions of human rights and the West to cast human rights and NGOs as agents of 
foreign control. As the majority of the local and regional HROs of this study receive some sort of 
foreign funding, from a variety of international sources, I problematize the state’s portrayal of 
human rights and NGOs throughout this paper. However, there are reasons for skepticism on this 
issue, and the foreign funding of American democratic reform NGOs has been suggested to be a 
method of foreign policy for American interests. The US has always had a deep interest and 
involvement in Egypt and its affairs. Egypt is the biggest receiver of US foreign aid, after Israel, 
with about $2 billion a year, most of it going to the Egyptian military (Strasser 2011:1). The 
paradox of American aid to Egypt is the proportion of aid going to the military; as one of they 
major abusers of human rights and an institution that actively restricts civil society, the US is 
bolstering the military’s power while actively claiming they support democracy in the country. A 
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few weeks after Mubarak was overthrown, USAID directed about $65 million towards 
democratic development, or projects that build civil society and political organizing (Strasser 
2011:2). Most of the money will go towards American NGOs, the Washington based democracy 
groups of National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems, rather than local Egyptian groups. Previously, 
the Bush Administration had used civil society as a foreign policy tool, known as the Freedom 
Agenda, to pressure Mubarak towards democratic reforms. “In October 2007 cable released by 
WikiLeaks from the US embassy in Cairo suggests that democracy and governance 
programming were part of an effort to “optimize American influence” in Egypt during the 
leadership succession crisis that the embassy predicted would follow Mubarak’s retirement or 
death” (Strasser 2011). The use of foreign funding to preserve American power in the coming 
struggle for power is not a complete falsity, and the paradox of American aid towards Mubarak’s 
repressive rule underlines the issues in the debate. However, not all foreign sources are directly 
related to state or American power, as many foundations, organizations, and other kinds of 
agencies do offer Egyptian NGOs funds. As a result, some organizations do not accept funding 
from any US organizations but will accept funding from Danish, Dutch, and Swedish 
organizations; others differentiate between governmental and nongovernmental donors (Pratt 
2006: 13). 
 After the 2011 revolution, civil society organizations continue to fear accusations of 
using foreign funding illegally both by Mohammad Morsi and by current President Sisi. Many 
HROs claim that the human rights situation was worse under Morsi than Mubarak, since 
“[Morsi’s] government refused to approve most of the outside grants they receive to run 
programs in Egypt, forcing some to lay off staff or cut salaries, and keeping them from the work 
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they were founded to do”(Chick 2013). More than half of the staff of the Egyptian Human Rights 
Organization was laid off and multiple proposals for projects were rejected, something almost 
unheard of under Mubarak. Current President Sisi is not more progressive. In the wake of 
violence in Sinai, current President Sisi amended the penal code for foreign funding to make a 
harsher punishment for those breaking the law (Enas 2014:2). 
The foreign funding debate greatly influences the people’s perception of NGOs, and the 
regional HROs of my study must work within these constraints to promote human rights and 
their realization by a populace who has been socialized to view them as Western. 
 
 
3.6 HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS AS TRANSLATORS BETWEEN THE 
LOCAL AND TRANSNATIONAL 
 
Merry (2006) considers how human rights language is used within the division of labor of 
human rights groups, particularly in local and transnational contexts. Merry considers the 
paradox of human rights norms in a similar manner to An-Naim; she finds that human rights 
discourse must be tailored to the local context and within a local cultural framework while also 
being part of the global human right system that emphasizes the value of universal human rights 
(Merry 2006:49). Human rights may be Eurocentric in origin and inspiration, but it is one of the 
olnly tools for the struggle for the rights of the disenfranchised. (Merry 2006:49). Human rights 
from transnational sources are typically vernacularized, or adapted to local institutions and 
meanings. Merry examines the actors who engage in this process of vernacularization of rights, 
and describes them as “people in the middle: those who translate the discourses and practices 
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from the arena of international law and legal institutions to specific situations of suffering and 
violation, They work to negotiate between local, regional, national, and global systems of 
meaning” (Merry 2006:39).  Regional human rights groups, especially those who have a 
grassroots presence in a country, may fit this role, as they move between discourses of the Arab 
countries they work with, adapting their work to fit other contexts. They remake transnational 
ideas using local terms, while reinterpreting local ideas in the language of international and 
national human rights (Merry 2006:42). Merry demonstrates that vernacularization varies in 
different contexts, for example, the extent of resistance or indifference it encounters, or the 
changing historical moments and national context of the vernacularization (Levitt and Merry 
2009:457).  It is important to consider the ways that of HROs ‘vernacularize’ human rights in the 
specific political context in Egypt. Prior to the revolution, human rights was a way to criticize the 
regime, and after the revolution human rights language is widely used as a tool of transformation 
and hope for change in the repressive policies of the past.  
Merry explains that these translators are channels of information, but unfortunately, their 
ambiguous loyalties are often questioned with charges of double-dealing or disloyalty, most 
typified by the foreign funding debate. HROs in Egypt are usually dependent on foreign funding 
and global media attention, and their work is often influenced by the power relationship of 
appealing to funders and the media. Transnational human rights principles gather this kind of 
appeal, which she finds problematic, as some organizations may adopt human rights language 
even if they prefer a different approach. Another challenge to vernacularization is the need for 
resonance with cultural traditions and narratives, which may sacrifice ideals and exclude 
significant groups (Snow 2004:401). As a result, the discourse can be less radical, with hopes of 
a slower social change.  
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Merry’s conception of translators fits well into the context of the regional groups of my 
study. In CIHRS’ “About Us” section of their website, they acknowledge their role in shaping 
the understanding of human rights and its discourse in the region. Their work in coordinating key 
NGOs in the Arab World to work together and acknowledge their role in the discussion of 
culture and human rights, “For this purpose, CIHRS focuses on analyzing the difficulties facing 
the application of international human rights law, disseminating a culture of respect for human 
rights in the region, and engaging in dialogue between cultures regarding the various 
international human rights treaties and declarations” (CIHRS n.d.). ANHRI collects the 
publications of various Arab human rights organizations and serves as a source for up-to-date 
and expert information from local HROs, giving them a metaphorical “megaphone to magnify 
their voices in their countries and across the region” (ANHRI n.d.). In their “About Us” section, 
ANHRI also acknowledges their role in creating a discourse with discussions of limitations that 
culture may place in the respect to human rights,  
In particular, there are critical areas that are not only taboo intellectually in the 
Islamic world and culture, but for which there are also no groups in the region 
today to even work on, such as, the death penalty, and rights of Christian 
minorities. Our objective is to create a space where these issues and other vital 
information about human rights can be discussed freely, and where people who 
share an interest in these areas can create a community (ANHRI, n.d.). 
 
Besides emphasizing Arab culture and its relationship with human rights, both groups play a role 
in human rights vernacularization in their emphasis on using the Arabic language to make human 
rights information available to Arabic readers worldwide. Both groups publish all of their 
literature in Arabic and English using the Internet to reach the broadest segment of the Arab 
public. ANHRI notes, in particular, that their role as human rights information disseminators fills 
a gap in the Arab media, which is often censored or state-run. Human rights are a highly 
politicized topic, and its coverage reflects this; it is often subject to changes in political interests 
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and climate. The way human rights are slanted in the media can cause a negative effect on the 
image, activities, and public perception of HROs. ANHRI views their work in gathering Arab 
human rights information in one place that is accessible to the Arabic speaking public as urgently 
necessary (ANHRI n.d.) 
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4.0: TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS, REGIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS, AND THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION 
 In my literature review, I discussed global civil society and human rights broadly, and 
specifically in the Egyptian case. I also hoped to explain the significance human rights played in 
the Egyptian revolution as well as summarize the challenges to human rights in Egypt. My 
overall research question has been about the role of regional human rights groups during the 
Egyptian Revolution, and in this chapter I work toward answering it by using print news media 
to understand the behaviors of the regional groups during this transformational period. Here, I 
am interested in questions like: Did regional human rights groups have a direct role in the 
revolution? What types of actions did the regional HROs take during the Egyptian Revolution? 
How do regional HROs engage with the government and the Egyptian people? Are the regional 
HROs primarily working in information politics or do they serve other types of purpose? What 
areas of human rights were most discussed by regional HROs?  
I expect that regional HROs played a large role in the Egyptian Revolution, utilizing the 
revolutionary spirit to fight towards global human rights by mobilizing activists and spreading 
information on human rights abuses, especially because of the Arab Spring’s regional scope.  I 
expect to find that human rights groups engaged with the government mostly through criticism, 
rather than discussion, as I have shown in my literature group the antagonistic relationship 
between the government and civil society. I further expect that the issue of police brutality was 
central to the work of regional human rights organizations during this time, as police brutality is 
experienced across all classes, ideologies, and professions. 
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4.1. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1.1 Choosing the TSMOs  
 
Data on transnational organizations are available from Smith and Hughes’s updated 
dataset of transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs). The dataset draws information 
about groups from the Yearbook of International Organizations, published yearly by the Union 
of International Associations (UIA), a group mandated by the United Nations to assemble a 
database of international organizations. The UIA aims to gather information about all 
international organizations involving national governments or citizens from at least three 
countries (Smith 2008:248). The Yearbook includes information like founding dates, 
organizational structure, headquarters, aims, counts of NGO and IGO connections, finance type, 
and countries of activity. Like all data sources, the Yearbook has its limitations; each volume 
covers organizations as they were a few years prior, and likely underreports informal or militant 
groups.  
From the population of TSMOs in Smith and Hughes’s dataset, I selected human rights 
organizations active in the MENA. Rather than selecting any TSMO with members in the 
MENA, I wanted to identify organizations with primary or secondary headquarters in the region, 
as these organizations likely participated to a greater degree in the Arab Spring social 
movements. There are few TSMOs headquartered in the MENA region. Focusing only on 
organizations that appear in the yearbooks from 2008 on, there are only 58 TSMOs 
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headquartered in the MENA.6 Of those 58 MENA TSMOs, 21, or 36% of them are 
headquartered in Israel, whereas 37, or 64% of them are headquartered in Arab countries.  
Figures 2 and 3 provide the substantive focus and country location for the 37 TSMOs 
headquartered in the Arab World. TSMOs vary greatly in type, with the majority of 
organizations being involved in development, human rights, or political movements. 
Surprisingly, a small minority of TSMOs headquartered in the Arab World are religious social 
movement organizations. The majority of TSMOs headquartered in the Arab World are in Egypt, 
which holds more than 38% of Arab TSMOs. Less than half that amount are headquartered in 
Morocco, which houses 16% of Arab TSMOs, and Tunisia follows with 14%. 
Figure 2 and 3: TSMOs in the Arab World, by focus and country 
              
Because human rights were a major theme of the Arab Spring revolutions, I focus only on 
human rights TSMOs. Although I initially planned a comparative study, Yemen and Syria had 
only one human rights organization each, and sources on Tunisian TSMOs were overwhelmingly 
in Arabic and French. Given my limited understanding of French, I chose to focus on the 
Egyptian case, for which information on Egyptian TSMOs was available in English and Arabic. """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
6 As a comparison, I did a similar search for TSMOs headquartered in sub-Saharan Africa and found 136 TSMOs. 
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I chose two transnational human rights organizations to study, both headquartered in 
Cairo: the Arab Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI) and the Cairo Institute of 
Human Rights Studies (CIHRS). Both of these groups are regional Arab HROs. The Yearbook 
offers some important information about the HROs, summarized in Table 1. CIHRS was founded 
in 1983, while ANHRI is the newest to the scene, founded in 2003. The member countries 
involved in these regional groups also differ, with ANHRI working with more Arabic speaking 
countries than CIHRS. Note here that these human rights groups involve the Arab World, rather 
than the whole of the MENA, which includes non-Arab countries like Iran, Turkey, and 
Afghanistan.   
Table 1: Yearbook Information on the Regional HROs 
 
 
4.1.2 The Regional Human Rights Organizations 
 
 In order to understand the activities Egyptian human rights organizations played during 
the course of the Egyptian revolution, I conducted a qualitative content analysis of international 
newspapers from the LexisNexis database. SMOs and media have an inter-dependent, though 
uneven, relationship. “Movements need the news media for three major purposes: mobilization 
validation, and scope enlargement” (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1989:116). It is in a SMO’s interest 
to present the movements’ aims to the wider public to exert pressure on their opponent (Cohn, 
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Barkan, and Halteman 2003). In this case--as is the case for many TSMOs--the opponent of 
HROs is the state. The news media’s influence can be seen in the area of international human 
rights. News reports are known to be an informal way of documenting abuses, shaping public 
opinion, and influence the development of international foreign policies (Ovsiovitch 1993). One 
of the goals, then, of an HRO is to receive media coverage on their views and activities. If the 
HRO is an active player in the greater human rights movement, the news media is likely to offer 
sufficient data regarding the actions of HROs during the course of the revolution.  
I collected articles on regional HROs from the Egyptian Revolution day of January 25, 
2011 to the 2013 Egyptian coup d’état of democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi by 
current President (then, General) Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on July 3rd 2013. My primary data sources 
include Daily News Egypt, Egypt Independent, Awsat Masriya, Bikaya News, and al-Ahram 
Weekly, all online English-language independent Egyptian news sources. The intended audience 
for these newspapers is not the average Egyptian, who would read news in Arabic, but for 
educated Egyptians who seek an independent news source in English. It is not surprising that 
these newspapers discuss human rights and HROs extensively, their audience is more likely to be 
interested in human rights. For the three regional HROs, I gathered and analyzed news articles 
on type of human rights abuses discussed, direct dealings with the government or military, 
interactions with other HROs, campaigns, and conferences. Searches yielded 371 news articles. 
 
4.1.3 Coding Protocol 
 
 Once I collected the news data, I sorted and analyzed the information in each document 
by using MAXQDA, a qualitative analysis tool. I designed a coding protocol after an initial 
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reading of the first twenty articles. After taking careful notes of the mentions of the regional 
HROs in the news media, I developed 18 categories to describe the types of human rights abuses 
reported on, as well as other actions of HROs during this period (see table 1.1). I then coded the 
articles, selecting quotations from the text that described human rights abuses or organizational 
activities. Across the 371 news articles, I coded 479 quotations. 
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4.2 RESULTS 
 
 I now turn to the analysis of the data I collected in two major areas: organizational 
activities and organizational content. I also tracked organizational networking with other HROs 
and SMOs, but that data will be addressed in the following chapter on HRO networks. Activities 
are the types of actions the organizations were doing—conferences, direct dealings with the 
government, and other kinds of action. The majority of the newspaper articles simply reported 
statements by HRO board members on human rights abuses, so I created sub-categories based on 
the content of these statements.  
 
4.2.1 Organizational Activities 
 
4.2.1.1 The Cairo Institute of Human Rights Studies in Action (CIHRS): There was 
no evidence of CIHRS directly mobilizing activists through protest or demonstrations. Instead, 
throughout times of high protest activity, CIHRS would offer detailed information on human 
rights abuses, and demand investigations into abuses and justice for protestors. CIHRS also 
participated in election monitoring, discussions with the government, conferences, and an annual 
report of human rights in the Arab World. 
CIHRS occasionally engaged directly with the government. On October 3, 2011, CIHRS 
and ANHRI (the other regional organization of this study) were joined by the founder of the 
Hisham Mubarak Law Center in a meeting with Egypt’s Intelligence Chief Mourad Mowafi to 
discuss the deterioration of Egypt’s human rights record. The rights groups conveyed their 
demands related to political freedoms, human rights, and socioeconomic rights, calling for  
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an urgent and detailed timeline to transfer authority to an elected, civilian body, 
lifting the emergency law and ending military trials for civilian. They also called 
for swift amendments to the law regulating the establishment of labor unions and 
syndicates, modifying the labor law to further guarantee better conditions for 
workers, and setting a fair minimum and maximum wage (“Rights groups meet 
intelligence chief” 2011).  
 
CIHRS lead a coalition with the other regional group of this study, ANHRI, comprised of 
two other local organizations--the Egyptian Association for Community Participation 
Enhancement and the Center of Appropriate Communication Techniques for Development--in 
election monitoring the results of the first election after the January 25th revolution. After 
postponing elections in September due to concerns that established parties would gain undue 
advantage, Egyptians began the electoral process in early December. Though Egyptian NGOs 
demanded for international monitors for the first election after the revolution, the Egyptian 
military banned international groups from monitoring the outcome for the parliamentary 
elections, for fear of organizations “interfering with Egypt’s sovereignty” (“Egypt Prohibits 
International Monitors” 2011).  
Monitoring by local groups was not a completely new notion, and is largely viewed as a 
victory for civil society in Egypt. Election monitoring by civil society groups in Egypt began in 
2005, after much resistance. Bahei el Din Hassan, the director of CIHRS had commented that 
“the experience of election monitoring established beyond a doubt the credibility of human rights 
and advocacy NGOs were among Egypt’s political forces and carved out a new role for the 
human rights movement that will be difficult to reverse” (Shehata 2007: 65). In 2010, 
organizations had monitored the parliamentary elections and proved they were fraudulent, 
fighting a serious battle to affirm the role of civil society, but ultimately failing in annulling the 
results. However, this event was seen by many CSOs as laying the groundwork for preparing for 
the revolution (“Election monitoring coalition” 2011). 
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On December 1, 2011 CIHRS and other organizations monitored the polling stations 
across Egypt. They reported minor violations and irregularities, but deemed the first round of 
elections overall to be an “overture for the battle of democracy” (“Election monitoring coalition” 
2011:2). The coalition found that the state entities responsible for organizing the elections, the 
Supreme Electoral Commission and the Ministry of the Interior, made multiple blunders, like 
late arrival of ballots, running out of phosphoric ink, and not establishing proper privacy 
measures. They noted that particularly inhuman conditions for election monitors prompted the 
FJP (Freedom and Justice, the political party of the Muslim Brotherhood) Party to help run the 
electoral process, which was a clear conflict of interest. All parties were also involved in 
electoral bribes and campaigning violations (“Election monitoring coalition” 2011:1).  
 In another engagement with the government, on May 24, 2011, CIHRS addressed the 
cabinet directly in a letter about police brutality. They wrote that “the decades-old lack of 
confidence between police and people, which has not been treated for years, will need political 
solutions and cannot be muted simply by expanding the force or upgrading its equipment” 
(Zayad and Coles 2011). The organization made clear that there must be no reoccurrence of old 
tactics of the Mubarak era, when police took bribes and used torture to get confessions.  
 CIHRS also routinely engaged with Egyptian citizens by hosting educational activities 
like conferences and seminars, with more than six conferences involving other local 
organizations held at the CIHRS during the revolution. These conferences were on a range of 
topics such as the emergency law, transitional justice, institutional corruption, and the Tunisian 
revolution. Experts from other civil society and advocacy organizations were often in attendance. 
On one occasion on September 8, 2011, a seminar on police brutality involved a representative 
of the Ministry of Interior, Ahmed El-Dessouki, the director of civil society communications. 
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The reform of the interior ministry was a top demand of Egypt’s revolution leaders, but human 
right experts remained skeptical (“Experts debate reform” 2011). El-Dessouki maintained that 
reform cannot happen overnight, but highlighted the ministry’s steps towards reforms, such as 
drafting a new law governing National Security. In the debate, other experts and activists were 
present and voiced their concerns, including Gamal Eid, the director of ANHRI (the other 
regional organization of my study), Khaled El-Bashi, editor in chief of an Egyptian online 
newspaper, and Mohamad Mahfouz, former police officer and activist in the “Honorable Police 
Officers” movement. At the end of the conference, El-Dessouki concluded that the Ministry of 
Interior was changing and welcomed suggestions as well as criticism that could help the reform 
process (“Experts debate reform” 2011). Overall, these conferences – and the efforts of CIHRS 
activists to promote a discussion on the progress of the revolution – reveal that CIHRS played a 
special role in the struggle for greater democracy. 
 Like most human rights organizations, CIHRS produces statements on human rights 
abuses. The news also reported the production of a unique type of literature on human rights—an 
annual report. Like international HROs, who produce an annual report with detailed reporting on 
a year of human rights in a given country, CIHRS produced a report on the state of human rights 
in the Arab World in 2012. A portion of the annual report was published in Al-Ahram: the 
introduction detailed the director’s unsurprised reaction to the authoritarianism of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (“From tortured to tyrant” 2013). They began producing annual reports in 2009. 
 
4.2.1.2 The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information in Action (ANHRI): ANHRI 
was particularly active in their engagement with the government, representation of activists in 
court, election monitoring, and creation of political platform on the web. 
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Like CIHRS, there is no evidence of ANHRI involved directly in the planning of protests 
and demonstrations. However, much of ANHRI’s work is in in support of activism. On January 
27, 2013, after the controversial verdict following the Port Said massacre (the bloody riot 
occurring at the Port Said Football Stadium between fans of two opposing soccer clubs) ANHRI 
anticipated demonstrations in Tahrir Square. ANHRI “set up an operation room to monitor the 
events of Friday’s demonstrations. The operation room was set up to record violations against 
the right of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression and to provide the legal support to 
victims of such violations” (“EU, Britain and ANHRI condemn” 2013). ANHRI dedicated two 
phone lines to receive any reports of violations or inquires related to legal aid.  
The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI) also engaged with the 
state, even more so than CIHRS. On March 22, 2011, unidentified army leaders promised to 
investigate allegations of torture by Military police after rights groups condemned the Chief 
General’s denial of the allegations. Army leaders directly engaged with ANHRI when they sent a 
mediator, a journalist, for documents with results of investigations into torture and testimonials 
of tortured and detained civilians. ANHRI sent two copies of the file, one to the army and one to 
Prime Minister Emssam Sharaf with hopes for a quick investigation (Army promises to 
investigate 2011).  
 On July 6, 2011, the director of ANHRI, Gamal Eid presented 32 recommendations for 
restructuring and reforming of the Ministry of Interior with the ministry spokesman General 
Marwan Moustafa. Surprisingly, the ministry official confessed criminal acts in the past and that 
they continue to make these mistakes in the present (“Rights activist recommends security 
reforms” 2011). Eid’s recommendations were divided into three sections: “the first targets the 
immediate reforms that do not require budget allocations or decrees issued by authorities higher 
 52 
than the minister of interior; the second includes reforms that need coordination with other 
institutions, while the third part includes long-term reforms (“Rights activist recommends 
security reforms” 2011). Other recommendations included sacking police officers involved with 
torture, hiring law graduates to fill the security vacuum, and an immediate apology from the 
Ministry regarding the deaths of activists in the January 25 revolution. Eid understood that the 
reaction to the recommendations could redefine the relationship the government had with human 
rights groups, noting that “the ministry's reaction to those suggestions will show through their 
performance; they may call us again for more communication, or they will never call back,” Eid 
said (“Rights activist recommends security reforms” 2011:3). ANHRI also participated in the 
meeting with Egypt’s Intelligence Chief along with CIHRS, as I mentioned above.  
 Perhaps the most important work that ANHRI did during this revolutionary time period 
was representing activists in court, using their expertise as human rights lawyers. Their most 
important case involved the January 25 revolution directly. In August, ANHRI faced problems 
when trying to attend Mubarak’s trial. ANHRI was representing “16 families of the martyrs, 200 
members of the families” and expressed concern about attending the trial, as legal procedure 
would be faulty if representatives of the families could not attend (“Lawyers, journalists face 
challenges” 2011). In January of 2012, ANHRI and other local groups jointly filed a case to stop 
the use of live ammunition and tear gas to disperse protests and demonstrations. The HROs filed 
on behalf of a young activist Malek Mostafa and his wife, who were shot at by rubber bullets, 
which took Malek’s right eye.  
 ANHRI also represented activists in other high profile cases. With a local group, the 
Association of Freedom and Thought and Expression, ANHRI spearheaded a legal case against 
Major General Abdel-Moneim Kato, an advisor for the military who publically claimed that 
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“protesters should be burnt in Hitler’s incinerators” (“Case against former Army General” 2011). 
ANHRI argued that his comments incited hatred and justified violence against citizens, and used 
four major activists as plaintiffs in the trial. ANHRI also took on the case of Gaber Abdel Haq, 
who was sentenced to one year of prison and a small fine for distributing flyers on December 23, 
2011. They took on the case to defend a citizen’s legal right to freedom of expression. ANHRI 
defended another abuse of freedom of expression case of Alber Saber, who was accused of 
contempt of religion for making a video asking people to think for themselves instead of 
following religious authority figures. He was charged for spreading extremist views through 
social media, and was attacked by inmates because the police officer told them Saber had 
insulted religion (Saber sentenced 2011). On December 12, 2012 Saber was sentenced to three 
years of prison, though ANHRI and AFTE started the appeal process afterwards  
 In addition, ANHRI directly dealt with state suppression of state society: On December 
29, 2011, security forces raided ANHRI and 16 other NGOs, confiscating documents and 
equipment, shutting down the office, and arresting an employee of the Budgetary and Human 
Rights Observatory (BHRO) under allegations of receiving illegal foreign funding. (“Security 
forces, prosecutors” 2011). This was the first time since Mubarak’s ousting that such direct 
actions were taken against civil society. Though media sources seemed to agree on the number of 
NGOs, only six NGOs were named explicitly: ANHRI, Egyptian Arab Center for the 
Independence of Judiciary (ACIJ), BHRO, the International Republican Institution (IRI), 
National Democratic Institution (NDI) and Freedom House. None of the organizations were 
notified about any sort of investigation or allegations, though the Ministry of Justice claimed that 
investigations had revealed that a number of Egyptian and foreign organizations were receiving 
illegal foreign funding and doing illegal work in Egypt. “A security campaign has started today 
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against civil society organizations, especially rights organizations to terrify rights activists, 
silence them and stop their activities against oppression and injustice. Even Mubarak's regime 
did not dare to launch such campaigns against civil society organizations. This is an organized 
crusade that has been under preparation for a very long time, especially in the media,” ANHRI 
said in a statement on the event.  
 Like CIHRS, ANHRI also acted as a forum for education on political issues. Before 
Egypt’s first post-uprising parliamentary elections ANHRI and a German-based NGO launched a 
website to provide a space for debate and information on political issues called Egypt 
Electionnaire (“Electionnaire: Egyptians find” 2011). The concept, first developed in the 
Netherlands, functions as a tool for Egyptians to understand their opinions relative to the 31 
political parties contesting in the upcoming election. This kind organizing based on online 
initiatives is an interesting case of transnational networking. 
 
4.2.4 Organizational Content 
 
The majority of news reports involving the regional groups involved expert statements by 
the groups on specific events related to rights or democratization. I tracked the topics of these 
statements, and although these groups are issuing statements on similar issues in the same time 
frame, I found key differences in the emphasis CIHRS and ANHRI put on specific human rights 
issues. As per my coding protocol, the major issue statements were based on courts, 
religion/minorities, civil society, media, persecuting journalists, “democracy,” gendered 
violence, violence, activism and protests, and detainment and torture. (See Table 1.2) 
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CIHRS and ANHRI have similar numbers of quoted statements on key issues such as 
courts, gendered violence, and violence. However, they differed vastly in their emphasis on other 
issues. Most significantly, CIHRS had almost double the number of expert statements on the 
topic of persecuting journalists and media freedom. This shows that CIHRS has a sort of 
specialization on this topic, as the news media appears to discuss this topic with CIHRS more 
than ANHRI. CIHRS also discussed issues of activism and protest, religious minorities, and 
protests/activism more than twice as many times as ANHRI. On the other hand, on the topics of 
civil society and “democracy,” ANHRI has more than double the expert statements of CIHRS.  
 
In my coding protocol, I also examined quotes and comments by regional HROs overtly 
critical to specific state institutions. I wanted to see which institutions human rights groups 
tended to criticize most: the police, the government, or the military. ANHRI made 34 comments 
against the government, 24 comments against the military, and 10 comments against the police. 
CIHRS made 25 comments against the government, 7 comments against the military, and 5 
comments against the police. I observed that during the early stages of the revolution, criticism 
of the government was much more prevalent than criticism of the military. However, with the 
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military maintaining power post-revolution, the regional HROs directed their criticism to the 
military and its abuses.  
 
 
4.3 DISCUSSION 
 
4.3.1 Trends Involving Regional HROs 
 
4.3.1.1 Protest and Activism: The work of human rights organizations during the revolution 
was decidedly less protest-oriented than I had previously thought. There was no evidence of 
protest activity involving either regional HRO during the first ‘18 days’ of the revolution, nor the 
transitional phase afterwards. I found no evidence of ANHRI or CIHRS providing a meeting 
space for other organizations or orchestrating protests during this time. Instead, I saw these 
regional groups performing a different role in relation to activism and mobilization. Rather than 
planning protests, ANHRI and CIHRS were both supporting activism with information and fact 
checking; they worked to disseminate evidence to the public regarding the government violence 
towards protestors. The major goal of the regional groups was to monitor the behavior of the 
government and other institutions like the military, police, and media. They produced 
publications on violations of human rights and advocated for reforms in laws and structures that 
restrict freedoms.  
 
4.3.1.2 Engangement, then confrontation, with the State: Despite heightened animosity 
between human rights groups and the state, both regional groups engaged with the government 
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or military on many occasions in the initial stages? of the revolution. For example,  on July 6  
2011 ANHRI compiled recommendations for the ministry of the interior. This was an early case 
of the government attempting to show its interest in reform. The director of ANHRI 
acknowledged at the time the significance of the government response to the recommendations, 
and was aware of the clear possibility that this was for display purposes only. Later, on July 14, 
2011, Eid noted that the SCAF seemed to be largely ignoring public demands, since he had 
presented a memo with reforms, but “it has been a week since I met with them, and nothing 
happened” (“Tweet Nadwa” 2011). 
It struck me how often the regional groups, especially ANHRI, would participate in an 
open dialogue with a government that actively suppresses them. Some argue that this is due to 
the nature of human rights organizations and their work. El Nagger (2012) argues that “the goal 
of the human rights movement is not fundamentally revolutionary; rather it aspires and plans for 
incremental, gradual changes with the goal of promoting human rights principles and norms. 
Human rights groups hope to reform the government through reforming instruments, approaches, 
and institutions” (79).  
We can understand the early engagement of the state with HROs in the context of the 
narrative of the revolution. When the military sided with the protestors, the Egyptian people 
celebrated in the streets. The initial engagement of human rights groups by various institutions of 
government represent an acknowledgement of the protesters’ demands for human rights to be 
respected. This coincides with a perceived opening of the political space of NGOs immediately 
after the first18 days of the revolution (Cartens 2012: 88). Despite hopes that this kind of 
engagement would lead to progress on state-civil society relations and respect for human rights, 
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a defining moment that proved otherwise was the controversial SCAF civil society raids of 
December 2011.  
 
4.3.1.3 Regional HROs Engaging with the Democratic Process: El Nagger’s point on the 
reforming character of HROs may carry some weight but ignores the transformational role 
CIHRS and ANHRI took during the revolution, as monitors of democratization. My analysis 
shows that regional HROs did take on a unique role in the democratization process. A large 
portion of their statements and work were directed towards plans for the process of 
democratization. In much of the engagement between the regional HROs and the government, 
the regional groups were offering their advice and criticism of the past and current regime. They 
often made clear that any recurrence of old practices of the Mubarak regime would not be 
tolerated. The content of their human rights statements also supports the undertaking of 
democracy as a key issue. ANHRI and CIHRS often demanded election monitoring and 
identified violations in fair elections, informing the Egyptian public of the missteps of the 
process. They were never afraid to criticize the developments and shifts of power that were 
ultimately moving away from democracy. The regional HROs knew what the appropriate steps 
to democratic transition were, and when this transition shifted slowly to military rule, ANHRI 
and CIHRS quickly became openly critical of the lack of democracy. After Morsi was elected 
president, and the human rights situation of Egypt disintegrated further, ANHRI and CIHRS did 
not fear pointing out the authoritarian nature of his rule. This kind of confrontation is key to 
understanding their role in the revolution.  
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4.3.1.4 The Raids and Foreign Funding Debate Intensified: As mentioned above, at the end of 
December 2011, security forces raided 17 NGOs, including ANHRI. It is important to note that 
three of the organizations raided, Freedom House, National Democratic Institute, and 
International Republican Institute, are American INGOs working on issues of democracy and 
human rights. These three organizations have been working unregistered in Egypt for years, and 
took advantage of an opening of political space after the “18 days” of the revolution to register 
officially with MOSA (Cartens 2012: 79). Their American affiliation became an area of 
contestation in the subsequent debate that followed the raid. Cartens identifies the time from the 
18 days of revolution until the raid as an escalation of the foreign funding debate by the SCAF 
itself; the SCAF had adopted the same rhetoric against NGOs that Mubarak had used to suppress 
civil society for years (79). This includes creating a xenophobic climate that asserts a ‘foreign 
agenda,’ negative labeling of NGOs as a ‘third hand’ responsible for post-revolution violence, 
social stigmatization, and ultimately ended with the criminalization of NGO work through the 
raids (82). Following the raids, more than 40 NGO workers were called to trial, and were 
convicted in June 2013, in absentia (Witte 2013). This raid garnered major international attention 
and major criticism from the US, who expressed their deep concern and indicated that this would 
influence their aid package with Egypt.  
This event is key to the understanding of the influence of Egyptian NGOs in the 
revolution. The SCAF’s decision to target civil society organizations and actively intimidate and 
suppress their work suggests their importance in society and the process of democratization. The 
SCAF actively viewed the work of HROs as a threat to their existence and power; by raiding 
these NGOs they are simultaneously confirming their power in the transitional period while 
proving that little had changed in the authoritarian nature of the Egyptian state.  
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4.3.2 Differences between regional HROs 
 
 The data shows that there are differences between the regional groups themselves. 
ANHRI appears to have a more direct relationship with activism, particularly due to their legal 
character. As I mentioned earlier, they established an operation room in response to 
demonstrations regarding the Port Said massacre, meant to gather reports on human rights abuses 
and offering protestors legal aid. In this case, ANHRI is establishing itself as a tool for protestors 
to use in their opposition to the state. Due to ANHRI’s legal human rights nature, ANHRI can 
offer protestors support after human rights abuses if they seek to file complaints or charges 
against the violence towards protestors. CIHRS’s work appears to be less within a legal 
framework, and tends to emphasize human rights education.  
My analysis has shown me the unique role the regional groups have undertaken during 
the revolution as supporters of activism and the monitors of the democratic process. These 
regional groups have used their place in Egyptian society to establish themselves as spaces for 
debate and discussion on the developments of the revolution. While coding their activities, I took 
time to code any interaction between the regional groups and other local groups. This begs the 
question of the place regional groups play in local human rights networks of joint activity. These 
networks are the subject of my next chapter.  
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5.0: LOCAL AND TRANSNATIONAL EGYPTIAN HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORKS 
In the previous chapter, I sought to understand the work of regional HROs during the 
Egyptian Revolution. In this chapter, I focus on the role of regional HROs within the larger 
human rights networks. As discussed above, Keck and Sikkink’s (1999) key study on 
transnational advocacy networks (TANs) showed that local, regional, and international groups 
form networks to further their organizational missions, “by sharing information, attaining greater 
visibility, gaining access to different publics, multiplying channels of institutional access, and so 
forth” (93). HROs use networks to move information quickly, construct cognitive frames, 
demand government accountability, and leverage powerful actors to influence the situation in 
their favor (95). These networks are increasingly connected to the global stage, as local groups 
link their causes to transnational organizations. The transnational organizations of my study, the 
regional human rights groups, are the actors I seek to place in local human rights networks, in 
order to understand their role in the greater Egyptian human rights movement, especially in the 
context of the revolution. In order to answer my overall question of the role of regional HROs 
during the revolution, I spend this chapter analyzing the role of regional groups in Egyptian 
human rights networks. My questions for this chapter are: Are regional human rights 
organizations powerful actors in human rights networks? How have Egyptian human rights 
networks changed since the revolution? In what areas and types of action do Egyptian rights 
organizations work together?   
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5.1 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
5.1.1 Choosing the Local Rights Groups 
 
 
To understand relations between regional and local HROs, I first had to select local rights 
groups. In my initial study of regional HROs, I came upon a variety of local rights groups with 
whom regional groups worked. In this part of my study, I include all of these local rights 
organizations. I use the term “rights organizations,” because I am interested in local groups 
dealing with human rights in a broad way, including housing rights, prisoner’s rights, women’s 
rights, environmental rights, and children’s rights.  
Through my research on the regional rights groups, I found 15 local rights organizations 
in Egypt. In order to expand this sample beyond just those working with the regional groups, I 
utilized LexisNexis to search “Egyptian rights organizations,” and “Egyptian rights groups,” to 
find articles discussing the work of “rights groups” active during the defined timespan. After 
reading the first 20 articles for both search terms, I added 11 more groups to my list of Egyptian 
HROs. Combined with the two regional HROs I had chosen for this study, there were 28 total 
HROs in this study (see Table 1.3) I found no evidence of any of the local rights groups in 
having an Islamic or Islamist association. They are secular groups dealing with rights language, 
though some groups do work with persecuted Islamists.  
 
5.1.2 Creating the Adjacency Matrix 
 
In order to find out how the HROs related to one another, I conducted a social network 
analysis of the connections between Egyptian rights groups. Network analysis is based on the 
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idea that the most important components of social life are the nature of the relations that actors 
have with one another. These relations can be mapped into a structure, which determines to a 
great extent the nature of the relations within it (Mizruchi 2007). Matrices, which show the 
relations between actors, can be analyzed on their own, or used to create graphs that show social 
networks.  
Table 1.3 The Local Groups 
 
An adjacency matrix is the most common form of matrix used in social network analysis, 
and it represents who is next to, or adjacent to, whom in the “social space,” mapped by the 
relations that were measured (Jamali and Abolhassani 2006). It is simply composed of as many 
rows and columns as there are actors in the data set, and the elements represent the ties between 
the actors. Different elements of matrices denote different elements of the network being studied. 
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An adjacency matrix can be binary or weighted. A binary matrix contains only 1s and 0s 
representing any kind of relationship between the two actors. A weighted matrix contains 
numbers and 0s, where the numbers represent the total number of ties and 0s represent no ties. A 
matrix can be directed or undirected, asymmetrical or symmetrical. In directed matrices, actors 
can have one-way relationships with other actors. For example, Sue may like Bob, but Bob may 
not like Sue. In undirected matrices, relationships are mutual. (For example, if Jen worked with 
Max on homework, then we can also note that Max worked with Jen on homework)  
In my study, I created an undirected, symmetrical, and weighted adjacency matrix of the 
connections between HROs in Egypt, using the sample of 28 organizations I gathered from 
newspaper coverage. I looked for connections between each organization and every other 
organization. For each possible pair, I searched the two organizations on LexisNexis, together as 
one search term (for example “Nazra for Feminist Studies” AND “Egyptian Initiative for 
Personal Rights”). This would bring up any article mentioning both organizations. I read through 
every article in the search results, tallying the number of unique connections the organizations 
had with one another. My network analysis relies on media sources to understand the ties 
between organizations. Of course, the media is not a perfect data method for capturing all 
connections between organizations; it probably underreports the work of smaller organizations or 
less formal connections. However, it is one of the few data sources available for understanding 
human rights networks between groups and the relatively large number of articles I code 
maintains its relevance in explaining larger trends within the Egyptian human rights network.  I 
searched through all world newspapers for this data on the LexisNexis Database, but once again 
my primary data sources include Daily News Egypt, Egypt Independent, Awsat Masriya, Bikaya 
News, and al-Ahram Weekly, all English language newspapers.  
 65 
Throughout this process, I also noted types of connections, yielding four categories of 
connection types—statements, court representation, initiatives or campaigns, and protest. The 
majority of connections were based on statements on human rights abuses and events that other 
HROs signed to represent their support of the statement. In court representation connections, 
HROs work together on a legal case against the state in support of an abused person or activist. 
Initiative connections are those where HROs work together on a campaign or initiative on a 
specific issue. And if multiple HROs are involved in organizing or participating in a protest, they 
share a protest connection. After creating my initial matrix with total number of connections, I 
went through all of the data again to separate the connections into these categories. This allows 
me to have multiple matrices, and then multiple networks, based on specific kinds of 
connections. For the post-revolution sample, I coded 71 articles with ties mentioned. Of those 71 
total ties there were 4 protest ties, 11 campaigns and initiative ties, 8 court representation ties, 
and 36 statement ties. There were 11 other miscellaneous ties.  
Lastly, in order to understand the differences between human rights networks over time, I 
created a weighted adjacency matrix of joint organizational activity in a time period prior to the 
revolution. As I had defined the time period since the revolution as from January 25 to the 
election of current President Sisi, I picked a time period prior to the revolution of the exact same 
duration (3 years, 4 months, 10 days). I chose a time period from 2006-2009, due to the rise of 
social movements against the government like 6 April and the Kefaya movement. For the post-
revolution sample, I coded 15 articles with ties mentioned, 13 of which were statement ties and 2 
miscellaneous ties. 
I used the adjacency matrices I created to visualize and model the social network in 
structural graphs. Social network graphs provide researchers with new insights about network 
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structures and help them to communicate those insights to others (Freeman 2000). The network 
is made of points and lines, where points represent social actors and lines represent connections 
among actors. Sociologists often use networks to understand social roles and groups. Using the 
social network analysis software Pajek, I created visual networks from my matrices for HRO 
interactions as a whole as well as networks for the specific types of joint action. In the figures 
each organization is represented by a circle, or node, and the connecting lines represent ties. To 
create the figures, I used the Kamada-Kawai algorithm, which pulls organizations with more 
common ties together and pushes the least connected organizations to the outside of the image. 
 
5.1.3 Network Metrics: Centrality and Density 
 
The benefit of social network analysis is the ability to view relationships between actors 
and recognize central actors, as well as the ability to assess network structures as whole. Two 
common metrics social network analysts use to describe a network and its actors are density and 
centrality. I used an open source social network analysis software, UCINET, to calculate the 
network metrics.  
Density describes a network as a whole, while centrality focuses on the “most important” 
actors within a network. Density represents the proportion of possible relationships in a network 
to relationships that are actually present. The value ranges from 0-1, and is often presented as a 
percentage, where 1 represents a network where every actor is connected to each other the 
maximum amount of times possible. 
Centrality tells us about actors individually, in the context of the structure of the network 
as a whole. Highly central actors are more powerful actors in a network; they are more likely to 
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be leaders and key channels of information (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). There are three 
common metrics that help us understand central actors: degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, 
and closeness centrality. All of these measures characterize slightly different aspects of an 
actor’s structural position in a network. 
Degree centrality is the simplest definition of actor centrality, viewing central actors as 
those with the most ties to other actors in a network. Eigenvector centrality is a measure that 
reflects the facts that not all connections are equal, and in fact, connections to actors that are 
more influential are more important (Newman 2008). Shirley and Bradley (2009) explain, 
“Eigenvector centrality not only counts the number of nodes each node is connected to, but also 
weights these nodes according to their centrality. Essentially it is a measure of how well 
connected are the people to which you are connected” (9). Degree centrality measures are 
criticized because they take into account only the immediate ties that an actor has, or the ties of 
the actor's neighbors, rather than indirect ties to all others. One actor might be tied to a large 
number of others, but those others might be rather disconnected from the network as a whole. In 
a case like this, the actor may be quite central, but only in a local neighborhood. In contrast, 
closeness centrality highlights the distance between an actor and all others in the network 
(Hannneman and Riddle 2005). 
 
 
5.2 RESULTS 
 
5.2.1 Networks Over Time 
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 In this study, I analyzed news data to create networks of joint actions and statements 
between local and regional HROs during two different time periods--the time period after the 
Egyptian revolution and a time period before the revolution. (See figures 4 and 5) I compare 
these networks in terms of the network metrics I outlined above. Not only does the overall size 
and structure of the network change, but so do the organizations that are most central. One way 
to visualize the changes in central actors is to rank actors in terms of their centrality metrics, to 
get an idea of which organizations are most central in a given network. 
 
5.2.2 Networks as a whole: isolates and density 
 
First I examine the number of actors involved in each network. When an actor is not connected 
to a network, they are called an isolate. In the post revolution sample, there were 28 
organizations connected through a network of joint action. In the pre-revolution sample, there 
were 14 isolates, meaning that 50% of HROs were isolated from the network entirely, or not 
working with any other HRO on statements, protests, etc. Looking closer at the difference in 
organizations involved in the pre-revolution and post-revolution network also shows a huge 
growth in the diversity of type of human rights groups involved in the networks. In the pre-
revolution sample, we see the network is dominated by HROs working on human rights in a 
general way, or through legal means. In the post-revolutions sample, we see an increase in 
diversity of rights organizations. Women’s groups become central actors in the network, and we 
see other specialties such as economic and social rights, prisoner’s rights, and children’s rights. 
This suggests a growth in Egyptian rights networking across types of groups after the revolution. 
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The network density of the post-revolution sample is .4%. The network density for the 
2006-2009 sample is 4%, 10x that of the post-revolution sample. The considerably smaller pre-
revolution network influences this metric. Density decreased but the size of the network greatly 
influences its ability to be dense. The total amount of possible shared activities increased 
significantly in the post-revolution network.   
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5.2.3 Central actors: degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, and closeness 
 
Degree centrality views actors as most central based on the number of ties they have with 
other actors. In the pre-revolution network, I found that the actor with the most connections was 
the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, with 13 connections (see Table 1.4). CIHRS and ANHRI 
followed it closely, though, with 12 total connections, tying for second in the rankings of degree 
measure along with the Habi Center for Environmental Rights and the Arab Program for Human 
Rights Activists. In the post-revolution network, I found that the HROs with the most ties were 
the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, and the 
Hisham Mubarak Law Center, with a total of 27, 26, and 25 connections respectively (see Table 
1.5). Contrary to my hypothesis, the regional organizations were not most connected, though 
they still ranked highly; CIHRS and ANHRI had 22 connections each, putting them sixth in the 
rankings of most central.  
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Table 1.4 and 1.5: Degree Centrality Pre- and Post- Revolution 
 
Eigenvector centrality emphasizes actors who have connections to other highly influential 
actors. In the pre-revolution networks, the most central in terms of eigenvector centrality are the 
Hisham Mubarak Law Center, followed closely by ANHRI, which ties with the Habi Center for 
Environmental Rights (see Table 1.6). CIHRS comes in third in the eigenvector rankings. In our 
post-revolution network, the eigenvector centrality still gives us the Egyptian Organization for 
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Human Rights, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, and the Hisham Mubarak Law as the 
most central actors, just as with degree centrality (see Table 1.7). The regional groups of interest 
are less central, with ANHRI coming in eighth in the rankings and CIHRS as tenth.  
Table 1.6 and 1.7: Eigenvector Centrality Pre- and Post- Revolution 
 
Closeness centrality expresses social distance from each actor to every other actor in the 
network. In our pre-revolution network, Hisham Mubarak Law Center again ranks first, followed 
closely by CIHRS and ANHRI (see Table 1.8). In our post-revolution network, the closeness 
centrality still gives us the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, the Egyptian Initiative for 
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Personal Rights, and the Hisham Mubarak Law as the most central actors, just as before (see 
Table 1.9). CIHRS and ANHRI are ranked sixth in closeness centrality.  
Table 1.8 and 1.9: Closeness Centrality Pre- and Post- Revolution 
 
 
5.2.4 Categories: Networks of Statements, Initiatives, Protest and Court Representation 
 
 When completing the post-revolution adjacency matrix of networked connections, I 
noticed trends in joint action. I recoded the post-revolutionary network data based on type of 
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joint action, allowing me to make networks of types of action. The majority of connections 
between organizations were based on joint statements or statements co-signed by rights groups. 
The most common other types of joint action were initiatives, protests, and court representation. 
For these post-revolution networks, I focus only on degree centrality; the small size of these 
networks makes the other numerical values of centrality less significant. These smaller, action-
based networks lend nuance to the results of the networks; they allow organizations that may not 
have been most central in the whole networks to still be recognized as central if their work 
emphasized a specific kind of action. This breakdown by type of action helps account for the 
variety in tactics and strategies among organizations; especially in a broadly defined sample such 
as mine. By addressing differences in strategy, this gives a view of the network that takes into 
account the types of actions and what's important to organizations on the ground. The statement 
network (see Figure 6) included all 28 of the organizations in my study. The Association for 
Freedom of Thought and Expression appeared as the most central actor, followed by the Land 
Center for Human Rights, with 29 and 28 ties respectively. (see Table 1.10) CIHRS and ANHRI 
followed, ranked third and fourth, with 27 and 26 ties respectively. The Land Center for Human 
Rights was always ranked in the middle in terms of key organizations in the whole network, but 
they are the most well connected in participating in joint statements. 
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Table 1.10: Statement Post-Revolution Degree Centrality 
  
"
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The second largest network of joint action is initiatives and campaigns (see Figure 7), such as the  
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The second largest network of joint action is initiatives and campaigns (see Figure 7), such as the 
Nation Without Torture Campaign, “an anti-torture initiative founded by victims of torture and 
supported by the Hisham Mubarak Law Centre. The main goal of the campaign is to pressure the 
authorities into taking action in all torture cases since 25 January 2011, as well as calling for the 
effective supervision of prisons and the enforcement of laws regarding torture” (Torture since the 
revolution 2012). 16 of the 28 organizations were involved in initiatives or campaigns, or 57% of 
the sample. In this network, CIHRS, along with the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights are 
the most central actors, with 14 ties each. (see Table 1.11) ANHRI trails behind as 7th in the 
rankings, with only 3 ties. 
The protest network only involves 7 of the 28 organizations (see Figure 8), meaning 75% 
of the organizations were not involved in joint protests, according to newspaper coverage. 
Neither of the regional groups were involved in networked protest activity. (see Table 1.12) In 
this network, the Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims and Violence was the most 
central organization with 6 protest ties.  
The court representation network was the smallest network (see Figure 9), with only 6 of 
the 28 organizations networking on court cases. ANHRI was the only regional group involved in 
this network. In this network, I found a key organization that was less central in the whole 
network-- the Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims and Violence, which tied with the 
Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights and Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights as 
most central in the network. ANHRI followed as second in the rankings, with 5 ties. (see Table 
1.13) 
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Table 1.11: Initiatives/Campaigns Post-Revolution Degree Centrality 
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Table 1.12: Protest Network Degree Centrality 
 
Table 1.13 Court Representation Degree Centrality 
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5.3 DISCUSSION 
 
5.3.1 Networks Across Time 
 
In considering of the changes between pre- and post-revolution networks, a variable I had not 
previously considered is founding year (see table 1.14). 14 of the 28 groups are isolated from this 
network entirely. Of those 14, two of the groups were founded after the 2006-2009 time period I 
discussed, and four additional groups were founded within the pre-revolution time period. (see 
Table 1.14: the bolded groups are groups founded after 2009, and the italicized groups were 
founded during the pre-revolution time period of 2006-2009) Of those six groups that I identified 
as having a founding year that would influence their ability to play a role in the human rights 
network, only one of them makes it in the network itself: the Association of Freedom of Thought 
and Expression (AFTE), which was founded in 2006. Unsurprisingly, AFTE tends to rank in the 
middle in centrality metrics of the pre-revolution sample. As I noted in my results, the human 
rights networks in Egypt grew in density but also in diversity of specialization on specific types 
of human rights issues. We see that in the founding years as well; as time went on, more rights 
groups were being founded based on a specific type of rights, like children's rights, 
environmental rights, women’s' rights, and prisoner's rights. This growth in civil society is 
despite the fact that the state control of civil society, especially through NGO laws, only 
increases in repressive efforts and restrictions. This growth suggests an increase in the use of 
rights language and organizing around the issue of rights to describe key social problems. 
Among groups in both pre- and post-revolution networks, centrality changes can also be  
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Table 1.14 Founding  Year 
understood considering founding year. The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) is a 
highly connected network in the post-revolution sample, but trails behind in the centrality 
rankings of the pre-revolution networks. For EIPR, their growing central role probably has to do  
with the development of the organization itself. In contrast, EOHR, which was established in 
1985, and is considered the main human rights organization of Egypt, sees a major increase in 
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centrality post-revolution rather than pre-revolution. Though I cannot comment on the specific 
historical context that may play a role in their growth, it cannot simply be assumed as a function 
of founding year.  
 Despite what I had expected, the regional groups of my study do not rank as the most 
central organizations in the post-revolution networks. They tend to rank in the middle on various 
centrality metrics. This is in contrast to their highly central role in the pre- revolution networks.  
 
5.3.2 Categorical Networks 
 
 The sizes of human rights networks on specific joint actions offer us insight on the types 
of work by Egyptian HROs networks. By far, the largest network of HRO joint action is in 
statements, which tend to disseminate information on abuses or comment on developments of the 
Egyptian Revolution. There are no isolates in this network; every HRO is involved someway in 
joint statements on events. The next biggest type of network was the initiatives and campaign 
network, which includes 16 of the 28 organizations. Both of these types of networks emphasize 
their role in Keck and Sinkkink’s information and leverage politics, because statements and 
campaigns aim to disseminate human rights information while also attempting to mobilize 
through shaming. The smaller networks in court representation and protest suggest the smaller 
role these types of action play in the greater Egyptian human rights network during the 
revolution.  
The strength of human rights networks is in their ability to quickly and accurately 
disseminate information on events. Joint statements suggest a unanimous position on 
information, and cooperation among groups in understanding a full and accurate picture of an 
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event. Human rights groups that network on information benefit from utilizing the accurate data 
of other rights groups in their statements and reports. For example, across multiple articles 
describing statements, HROs utilized the El-Nadeem Centre for Rehabilitation Victims of 
Violence’s data on victims of abuse during the 18 days of the revolution. El-Nadeem Centre 
collected personal data of the detainments and the torture from the hands of the police and 
military that was key to CIHRS and ANHRI’s reports on police and military abuse of protestors 
during the 18 days.  
 Looking at the categories of post-revolution networks also highlights the fact that some 
rights organizations emphasize one sort of action over another. It also highlights the fact that 
despite not being central in the whole network, some organizations are highly connected in 
networks of specific types of action. Sometimes, this can be understood as an aspect of their 
functions and specializations. Court representation is an interesting characteristic of Egyptian 
human rights networks. As I noted in my previous chapter, one of my regional groups, ANHRI, 
clearly utilizes legal assistance and law in its efforts representing the abused, commonly 
activists. ANHRI connects with local groups in these court representations, like in the February 
28, 2012 case in stopping the use of live ammunition of protestors (Case to stop the use of live 
2012). The Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights and El Nadeem Center for 
Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence filed this case with injured activists and were later joined 
by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, the Arab Network for Human Rights Information 
and the Association of Freedom of Thought and Expression. I observed that in cases where rights 
groups represented activists in courts, the joint action usually involves three or more HROs. 
HROs benefit from the cooperation of other rights groups in their legal aid; they can share 
information and resources in creating their case against the state. Their specializations and 
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expertise help in joint legal cases. For example, the El-Nadeem Centre for Rehabilitation Victims 
of Violence specializes in providing a psychological testimony to be added to the case files 
where torture victims sought compensation from the government. The use of legal aid as a 
method of human rights advocacy generally grew in the years following the increased restriction 
on human rights organizations around 2002. Cartens writes, 
The role NGOs normally had (that of advocacy and raising awareness) was too heavily 
restricted, which made these NGOs reconfigurate their own strategies and at the same 
time formed an impetus for the start of new NGOs, who were more focusing on legal aid 
instead of advocacy. An example of the latter is the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, which 
was established 1999 and became one of the most important human rights NGOs in 
Egypt (Cartens 2012:74-75).  
 
This newer function of HROs as legal advocates is reflected in the court representation network, 
which includes six Egyptian HROs, all with legal advocacy aspects. This suggests that the focus 
on legal aid by HROs continues until now, as these organizations have found some legitimacy in 
using legal methods to oppose the state’s abusive actions. Levitt and Merry (2009) understand 
the use of legal aid as a characteristic of the local-transnational division of labor in human rights. 
Human right’s appeal to the international does offer the discourse legitimacy, but the weak 
enforcement in a world of sovereignty makes it difficult for activists to change institution. 
Human rights legal activism focuses on the state because  
It makes more sense to use the domestic legal system to exert pressure through 
that approach, turning to international only when the national fails. Indeed, 
although human rights ideas provide valuable rhetoric for social movements, most 
human rights activity focuses on forcing or persuading states to comply with their 
own laws or to pass new laws to protect their populations (Levitt and Merry 
2009:458).  
International activism, though, often complements national legal strategy. This may be a place to 
appeal to the local population, another way that activists may ‘vernacularize’ human rights into 
acceptable legal terms. ANHRI’s legal advocacy is both a human rights method of action and a 
way to gather more publicity to ultimately change the minds of average Egyptians who may not 
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consider human rights as part of their society. The high profile nature of ANHRI’s cases, and 
their relationship with the revolutionary actions can possibly improve public support and 
consciousness for HROs. ANHRI is unique in that it brings together activists and lawyers, two 
groups of people with very different training and backgrounds.  
 Though CIHRS does not work on legal advocacy, it appears more central in ties on one 
kind of important joint action—campaigns and initiatives. Human rights campaigns and 
initiatives tend to organize groups around specific issues, such as police brutality and torture, or 
on specific events, like the SCAF’s increased abuse of human rights and Morsi’s first 100 days 
in office, and work to exert actual pressure on authorities to address a human rights situation. 
They are often more publicized than statements, and usually include actual events or conferences 
rather than just information. As the most connected actor in that network, CIHRS works with a 
variety of organizations on issues that are deemed key to publicize and discuss further than just 
in a statement. An example of this is a campaign led by CIHRS in July 30, 2012, called “Our 
Rights in 100 Days” Campaign, which comes “immediately after a memorandum on human 
rights priorities during the first hundred days of Morsi’s presidency was sent to the president 
with the aim of imposing human rights priorities on his agenda during that period” (Cairo 
Institute for Human Rights Studies 2012:1).  
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6.0: CONCLUSION 
 
 Discussions of global civil society have emphasized the importance of NGOs and 
networking across borders on social movement issues. However, the geography of global civil 
society is uneven; I demonstrate that there is a distinctly low number of TSMOs headquartered in 
the Arab World. In my first chapter I work to outline major concepts of my project and elucidate 
the challenges that NGOs and human rights groups face in Egypt. My research seeks to analyze 
the role of transnational human rights organizing in Egypt, specifically looking at regional 
groups, which were headquartered in Cairo. Regional HROs headquartered in Cairo have a 
unique role in Egyptian transnational advocacy during the revolution. They are both 
transnational in scope, with work on human rights throughout the Arab world, while carrying a 
grassroots influence among Egyptian rights groups.  
Though the regional HROs did not play a direct role in mobilizing protestors during this 
revolutionary time period, they had an indirect role in supporting activism. Both groups would 
release statements about abuses to protestors and demanded justice. ANHRI often supported 
activists this through legal advocacy, representing activists in high profile cases against the state. 
Both groups were involved in public educational events, often acting as a discussion space for 
considerations on the revolution. Both groups also took their role as part of the democratic 
process seriously; content of their statements in newspapers were often related to the democratic 
process, criticizing political actors for moving away from democracy. They also monitored 
elections with other NGOs. Both groups engaged with the state, though it appeared that the 
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engagement was symbolic and short-lived. Both groups held conferences as a space for activists 
to intellectually debate and consider the problems facing Egypt and its democratization process; 
this space often had a multitude of voices, bridging activists, citizens, academics, and lawyers 
together to discuss the revolution’s development. Though many had hoped that the revolution 
would bring about a new era of state-civil society relations, the armed raid of 17 NGOs under the 
SCAF’s rule and the subsequent conviction of 43 NGO workers under Morsi’s regime show that 
the effective space of NGOs has changed little since the revolution. It also shows that the key 
players of Egypt’s revolution view rights NGOs as a threat to their authoritative power.  
 Overall, the human rights networks in Egypt have become denser, more diverse, and 
larger, since the revolution. We see the rise in these networks of different types of rights groups, 
such as women’s rights, children’s right’s, and prisoner’s rights; the increase in diversity and 
specialization of Egyptian rights groups lends more expertise to the network of human rights 
information. This progress is despite the restrictions the state gives to civil society. When 
comparing the post-revolution human rights network to a 2006-2009 sample, the regional HROs 
have become less central with the rise of more central local rights groups like the Egyptian 
Initiative for Personal Rights or the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression.  
Looking across categories of action in the post-revolution network, we see that rights groups 
connect most with joint or co-signed statements, as well as campaigns or initiatives, confirming 
their role in information politics. Some HROs connect to other HROs through court 
representation and protests, but this was a small minority of groups. ANHRI is a central actor in 
court representation of activists. CIHRS is a highly central actor in organizing campaigns and 
initiatives. Neither regional group has ties within the protest network. 
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 In An-Naim’s understanding of human rights dependency theory, he notes that the human 
rights regime emphasizes the power of Western governments in pressuring developing countries 
to respect human rights norms, rather than local groups working in support of their local 
constituencies with activities addressed to their own governments. An-Naim argues that 
increasing the space of local and regional groups as crucial in diminishing this dependency. 
Regional groups represent an important role in the human rights movement’s division of labor, 
and understanding their place in the local politics of a revolution can help us understand the ways 
that transnational organizing can work to influence the Egyptian people against the state. 
 Understanding the role of regional groups in bridging the local/global division of labor 
gives them a unique role in the transnational human rights network. The regional groups have 
both a local function and a function within the international system. Merry’s (2006) 
understanding of organizations as “translators” of human rights discourse fits the work of the 
regional groups well. They are highly connected to the Egyptian network while maintaining 
activities and interest in the Arab region as a whole. Smith (2001) notes the differing roles of 
local and transnational groups in the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle. She finds that local groups 
were important to local participant mobilization, and were often associated with groups with 
extensive transnational ties. These transnational groups had sustained transnational 
communications, played roles in framing and informing protests of critiques of the global trading 
system, lobbied governments, and supported other groups’ mobilization efforts (Smith 2001:6). 
As I demonstrated in chapter  
  I encountered unique problems due to the subject matter of the work—its current and 
unfolding nature and the fact that I was not doing research on the ground in Egypt influenced the 
scope and abilities of this project. One of the major challenges to work of this sort is language 
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itself. I used English newspapers and could only read organizational material if the websites or 
reports were in English. I had little access to biographical information on these groups in 
English, though I imagine this information is available in Arabic. Because I could not actually 
complete this research and data collection in Egypt, I was also limited to media data to 
understand the actions and ties of Egyptian organizations.  The media may underreport 
connections between smaller groups and may not report some activities that were not deemed 
worthy enough to be in the news. Furthermore, due to the fact that the events of Egypt’s 
revolution were still being shaped when I began this project, my chapters define their time 
frames slightly differently: the first chapter defines the revolutionary time period from January 
25, 2011 to July 3, 2013. I began the networking data later, after Sisi was elected, so I defined 
that time period from January 25, 2011 to June 3, 2014. This project would have benefitted from 
defining the time periods in the same way.  
 This project has potential for future research on the role of regional groups in the human 
rights movement in Egypt. As I am currently improving my Arabic, this project would benefit 
greatly from research methods, like interviews with organizations within Egypt, and a working 
knowledge of the language in order to obtain more diverse data. In the future, if I continue this 
project, I would consider the place that international HROs play in the Egyptian networks—are 
they involved with multiple actors across the rights networks? Do they receive their information 
from local groups when publishing their annual reports? This work could also benefit from 
analysis of discourse across local, regional, and international groups, especially if the researcher 
can understand both English and Arabic. This project considers established organizations and 
their place in the Egyptian human rights movement and the revolution. Non-organizational social 
movement groups like Kefaya, Tamarod, and 6 April also played a unique role in the course of 
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the revolution, especially in mobilizing and organizing protests and demonstrations. In the 
future, researchers should consider their unique role in networking on information and activism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 95 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
Abdelrahman, Maha. 2007. “The Nationalisation of the Human Rights Debate in Egypt.” Nations and 
Nationalism 13(2):285–300. 
Amnesty International, 2011. Broken Promises: Egypt’s Military Rulers Erode Human Rights.” 
November 22. Refworld. Retrieved January 6, 2015 
(http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ecf38b92.html). 
An-Naim, Abd Allah Ahmad. 2001. “Human Rights in the Arab World: A Regional Perspective.” 
Human Rights Quarterly 23(3):701–32. 
Bevir, Mark. 2010. Encyclopedia of Political Theory. 2455 Teller Road,  Thousand 
Oaks  California  91320  United States: SAGE Publications, Inc.  
Billig, Michael. 1995. Banal Nationalism. SAGE. 
Browers, Michaelle. 2006. Democracy and Civil Society in Arab Political Thought: Transcultural 
Possibilities. Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press. 
Callaway, Rhonda and Julie Harrelson-Stephens. 2013. You Say You Want a Revolution: The Arab 
Spring and the Role of the Human Rights Regime. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network 
Cartens, E. L. 2014. “A Struggle over Space: Human Rights NGOs in Egypt and Their Battle against 
the State.”  
Chivers, Tom. 2011. “Egypt Protests: Tuesday 1 February 2011 as It Happened.” Telegraph, February 
2. Retrieved March 18, 2015 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8297700/Egypt-
protests-Tuesday-1-February-2011-as-it-happened.html). 
Cohn, Steven F., Steven E. Barkan, and William A. Halteman. 2003. “Dimensions of Participation in 
a Professional Social-Movement Organization.” Sociological Inquiry 73(3):311–37. 
Daily News Egypt, 2011. “Army Promises to Investigate Torture Allegations.” March 22. Retrieved 
March 6, 2015 (http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/03/22/army-promises-to-investigate-
torture-allegations/). 
Daily News Egypt , 2011. “Case against Former Army General Kato to Be Heard.” December 27. 
Retrieved March 20, 2015 (http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/12/27/case-against-former-
army-general-kato-to-be-heard-feb-1/). 
Daily News Egypt, 2011. “Electionnaire: Egyptians Find Their Political Match.” November 8. 
Retrieved March 6, 2015 (http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/11/08/electionnaire-egyptians-
find-their-political-match/). 
Daily News Egypt, 2011. “Election Monitoring Coalition Reports Minor Violations; Says Egypt Wins 
‘Electoral Battle.’” December 1. Retrieved March 6, 2015 
(http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/12/01/election-monitoring-coalition-reports-minor-
violations-says-egypt-wins-electoral-battle/).   
Daily News Egypt, 2011 “Experts Debate Reform within the Interior Ministry.” September 2011. 
Retrieved February 6, 2015 (http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/09/08/experts-debate-reform-
within-the-interior-ministry/). 
 96 
Daily News Egypt, 2011 “Lawyers, Journalists Face Challenges Attending Mubarak Trial.” August 2. 
Retrieved February 20, 2015 (http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/08/02/lawyers-journalists-
face-challenges-attending-mubarak-trial./). 
Daily News Egypt, 2011. “Rights Activist Recommends Security Reforms to Interior Ministry.” June 
7. Retrieved March 20, 2015 (http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/07/06/rights-activist-
recommends-security-reforms-to-interior-ministry/). 
Daily News Egypt, 2011. “Rights Groups Meet Intelligence Chief.” March 10. Retrieved March 20, 
2015 (http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/10/03/rights-groups-meet-intelligence-chief/). 
Daily News Egypt, 2011 “Security Forces, Prosecutors Raid Five NGOs, Shut down One.” December 
29. Retrieved March 6, 2015 (http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/12/29/security-forces-
prosecutors-raid-five-ngos-shut-down-one/). 
Daily News Egypt, 2011. “Tweet Nadwa Discusses Interior Ministry Reform in Tahrir Square.” July 
14. Retrieved March 20, 2015 (http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/07/14/tweet-nadwa-
discusses-interior-ministry-reform-in-tahrir-square/). 
Daily News Egypt, 2012. “Case to Stop Use of Live Ammunition Adjourned to Feb. 28 - Daily News 
Egypt.” January 17. Retrieved March 6, 2015 (http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/01/17/case-
to-stop-use-of-live-ammunition-adjourned-to-feb-28/). 
Daily News Egypt, 2013 “EU, Britain and ANHRI Condemn Escalation of Violence.” January 27. 
Retrieved February 27, 2015 (http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/01/27/eu-britain-and-anhri-
condemn-escalation-of-violence/). 
Daily News Egypt, 2012 “Saber Sentenced to Three Years for Blasphemy.” December 12. Retrieved 
March 6, 2015 (http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/12/12/saber-sentenced-to-three-years-for-
blasphemy/). 
De Tocqueville, Alexis. 1863. Democracy in America. 
El Naggar, Mohamed Hussein. 2012. “Human Rights Organisations and the Egyptian Revolution.” 
IDS Bulletin 43(1):78–86. 
Emilie M Hafner-Burton, Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 2005. “Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The 
Paradox of Empty Promises.” AJS Volume 110(5):1373–1411. 
Foley, Michael and Bob Edwards. 1996. “The Paradox of Civil Society.” Journal of Democracy 7(3). 
Retrieved January 18, 2015 
(https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v007/7.3foley.html). 
Gamson, William A. and Gadi Wolfsfeld. 1993. “Movements and Media as Interacting Systems.” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 528:114–25. 
Gaber, Yassin. 2014. “The Simplest Explanation of Egypt’s Revolution You’ll Ever Read | TakePart.” 
Retrieved March 1, 2015 (http://www.takepart.com/feature/2014/02/06/egypt-revolution-
timeline). 
Hicks, Neil. 2002. “Does Islamist Human Rights Activism Offer a Remedy to The Crisis of Human 
Rights Implementation in the Middle East?” Human Rights Quarterly 24(2):361–81. 
HRW, 2005. “Egypt: Margins of Repression | Human Rights Watch.” July 3. Retrieved April 4, 2015 
(http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/07/03/egypt-margins-repression). 
HRW, 2014. “Egypt: Rab’a Killings Likely Crimes against Humanity | Human Rights Watch.” 
August 12. Retrieved April 1, 2015 (http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/12/egypt-rab-killings-
likely-crimes-against-humanity). 
Jamali, M. and H. Abolhassani. 2006. “Different Aspects of Social Network Analysis.” Pp. 66–72 in 
IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence, 2006. WI 2006. 
 97 
Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1999. “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International 
and Regional Politics.” International Social Science Journal 51(159):89–101. 
Kirpatrick, David and David Sanger. 2011. “After First Talks, Egypt Opposition Vows New Protest.” 
New York Times, February 6. Retrieved January 18, 2015 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/world/middleeast/07egypt.html?pagewanted=all). 
Levitt, Peggy and Sally Merry. 2009. “Vernacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of Global 
Women’s Rights in Peru, China, India and the United States.” Global Networks 9(4):441–61. 
Marchetti, Raffaele. n.d. “Civil Society, Global Governance, and the Quest for Legitimacy.” 
Retrieved March  4, 2015 
(http://www.academia.edu/7743724/Civil_Society_Global_Governance_and_the_Quest_for_Leg
itimacy). 
Mizruchi, Mark S. 2007. “Political Economy and Network Analysis.” Sociologica (2/2007). 
Merry, Sally Engle. 2006. “Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle.” 
American Anthropologist 108(1):38–51. 
Mokhtari, Shadi. 2012. “The Middle East and Human Rights: Inroads Towards Charting Its Own 
Path.” Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 10(4):194. 
Monshipouri, Mahmood. 2014. Democratic Uprisings in the New Middle East: Youth, Technology, 
Human Rights, and US Foreign Policy. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers. 
Moussa, Jasmine. 2011. Competing Fundamentalisms and Egyptian Women’s Family Rights: 
International Law and the Reform of Shar?’a-Derived Legislation. BRILL. 
Moustafa, Tamir. 2007. The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic 
Development in Egypt. Cambridge University Press. 
Nada Mobarak Ibrahim, Aurélie Lachant. n.d. “NGOs as Civil Society Actors on Media Policy 
Change in Egypt: Capacity Building within a Contextual Framework.” 
Nasser, Helen-Margaret. 2014. “Not by Accident: How Egyptian Civil Society Successfully Launched 
a Revolution.” M.A., City University of New York, United States -- New York. Retrieved March 
18, 2015 
(http://search.proquest.com/docview/1527113830/abstract/D1F15D72782247D8PQ/1?accountid
=14709). 
Newman, M. E. J. 2008. “Mathematics of Networks.” Pp. 465–70 in The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics, edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Basingstoke: Nature 
Publishing Group. Retrieved March 6, 2015 
(http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_M000361). 
Ovsiovitch, Jay Samuel. 1993. “Human Rights Coverage in the Media: A Quantitative Content 
Analysis.” Ph.D., The University of Nebraska - Lincoln, United States -- Nebraska. 
(http://search.proquest.com/docview/304046052). 
Pratt, Nicola. 2006. “Human Rights NGO’s and the ‘Foreign Funding Debate’ in Egypt.” Pp. 114–26 
in Human Rights in the Arab World, edited by Anthony Tirado-Chase and Amr Hamzawy. 
University of Pennsylvania Press. Retrieved March 4, 2015 (https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/9254/). 
Pollock, John. n.d. “State Manipulation of NGOs: Government-Civil Society Relations in Egypt - 
Tufts Digital Library.” Retrieved March 4, 2015 
(http://dl.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:UA015.012.081.00009). 
Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. 1994. Making Democracy Work: Civic 
Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Ranko, Annette. 2015. The Muslim Brotherhood and Its Quest for Hegemony in Egypt: State-
Discourse and Islamist Counter-Discourse. Springer. 
 98 
Riddle, Mark and Robert Hannerman. n.d. “Introduction to Social Network Methods: Table of 
Contents.” Retrieved March 6, 2015 (http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/). 
Redgrave, Sue. n.d. “Global Civil Society 2001 - contentsPages - yearBook - civilSociety - Civil 
Society and Human Security Research Unit - Research - International Development - Home.”  
Said, Atef. 2012. “The Paradox of Transition to ‘Democracy’ under Military Rule.” Social Research: 
An International Quarterly 79(2):397–434. 
Said, Edward W. 1979. Orientalism. 1st Vintage Books ed edition. New York: Vintage. 
Shehata, Dina S. 2007. Islamists and Non-Islamists in the Egyptian Opposition: Patterns of Conflict 
and Cooperation. ProQuest. 
Shenker, Jack. 2011. “Cairo Protesters in Violent Clashes with Police.” The Guardian, January 25. 
Retrieved January 18, 2015 (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/25/egypt-protests-
mubarak). 
Shirley, Kathryn J. and Kelly D. Bradley. 2009. “Examining Graduate Committee Faculty 
Compositions – A Social Network Analysis Example.”  
Smith, Jackie. 2008. Social Movements for Global Democracy. JHU Press. 
Smith, Jackie, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco. 1997. Transnational Social Movements and 
Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State. Syracuse University Press. 
Smith, Jackie and Dawn Wiest. 2005. “The Uneven Geography of Global Civil Society: National and 
Global Influences on Transnational Association.” Social Forces 84(2):621–52. 
Smith, Jackie and Melanie Hughes. Transnational Social Movement Organization Dataset, 1953-
2013.  
Stachursky, Benjamin. 2013. The Promise and Perils of Transnationalization: NGO Activism and the 
Socialization of Women’s Human Rights in Egypt and Iran. 1 edition. New York: Routledge. 
Tarrow, Sidney. 1993. “Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the 
Repertoire of Contention.” Social Science History 17(2). Retrieved January 18, 2015 
(http://www.jstor.org/stable/1171283?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents). 
UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), 
available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html [accessed 6 April 2015] 
Wiest, Dawn. 2007. “A Story of Two Transnationalisms: Global Salafi Jihad and Transnational 
Human Rights Mobilization in the Middle East and North Africa.” Mobilization: An 
International Quarterly 12(2):137–60. 
Zayed, Dina and Isabel Coles. 2011. “Egypt’s Transition Tested by Security Breakdown.” Reuters, 
May 18.  
Zald, Mayer N. and John D. McCarthy. 1979. “Social Movement Industries: Competition and 
Cooperation Among Movement Organizations.” Retrieved January 18, 2015 
(http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/5

 "
 
100 
100 
 
